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In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorized Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), which established the authority of the president to use force to protect the 
United States from threats against the homeland. This authority allowed the president to 
use drones, even against U.S. citizens on foreign soil who have been deemed terrorists 
and placed on the kill list. The current process lacks procedural due process. These flaws 
have prompted critics to argue that a drone court should be created to address this 
concern. This thesis explores the issue of the drone court and asks, if one were created, 
what form should it take? How should it look? The thesis employs a policy options 
analysis to review three possible judicial forums for hearing these cases: the Foreign 
Surveillance Court (FISC), Guiora and Brand’s hypothetical Operational Security  
Court (OSC), and the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). Five criteria were 
evaluated: oversight of the executive branch, transparency, timeliness, judges and legal 
representation, and legal/procedural review. The OSC had the best evaluation because it 
supported procedural due process. However, policies will need to be implemented to 
ensure that OSC legal procedures are timely. 
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In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorized Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), which established the authority of the president to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” to protect the United States from threats against the homeland.1 The 
implementation of the AUMF broadened the president’s authority to use drones, even 
against U.S. citizens on foreign soil who have been deemed terrorists and placed on the 
“kill list.” While there is no official court proceeding, there is a non-judicial body that 
determines who is placed on the kill list.2 The non-judicial body consists of an 
interagency group selected by the military—not a military or civilian court—that reviews 
intelligence on the accused’s involvement in terrorist activities against the United States. 
Neither the accused nor a representative of the accused receives notification of the 
hearing to present evidence for the defense. By the time the military reviews the case, the 
accused has already been designated as a terrorist and placed on the kill list, which means 
that he or she can be executed by a drone attack at any time. There are critics who argue 
that the current process lacks procedural safeguards and that a drone court should be 
created to address these due process challenges.3 
To address this problem, this thesis proposes a hypothetical drone court to ensure 
that due process is implemented. If a drone court were created, what form should it take? 
How should it look? The drone court proposed in this thesis would consist of federal 
judges who weigh the evidence presented by government attorneys.4 The court would 
allow technically versed judges to make determinations concerning the sufficiency of 
evidence that exists before a decision is made to target a U.S. citizen. Unlike the military 
review, the drone court would have an established procedure for legal review. 
                                                 
1 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001), 1–2. 
2 Martin S. Flaherty, “The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and 
Judicial Safeguards,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38, no. 1 (2016): 39. 
3 Deborah Pearlstein, Enhancing Due Process in Targeted Killing (Washington, DC: American 
Constitution Society, 2013), 2, https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Pearlstein_-_Due_Process 
_in_Targeted_Killing.pdf. 
4 “Weight of Evidence Law and Legal Definition,” USLegal, accessed December 8, 2016, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/w/weight-of-evidence/. 
 xiv 
It is this targeting of U.S. citizens that has opened a dialogue to discuss the 
viability of establishing a drone court.5 This approach provides a novel opportunity to 
explore innovative processes and methodologies that will help strengthen the current 
procedure or assist in creating a new one. The alternative will explore the need to ensure 
constitutional procedural safeguards are in place so U.S. citizens are afforded procedural 
due process. However, the drone court argument is not without its critics; Steven Groves, 
for instance, asserts that the United States has a right to self-defense even, if a U.S. 
citizen is the target.6 
This thesis reviewed three models that could be used, in whole or in part, to create 
a drone court with the authority to decide who is eligible for fatal drone strike targeting. 
This thesis used a policy options analysis to evaluate criteria important to the foundation 
of the drone-court system, and to address the constitutional issues surrounding 
presidential and judicial authority.7 The five criteria selected were the executive branch, 
transparency, timeliness, judges and legal representation, and legal/procedural review.  
One drone court model proposal was a court similar to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance (FISC).8 Another proposal was a hypothetical drone court created by Amos 
N. Guiora and Jeffrey S. Brand called the Operational Security Court (OSC), composed 
of current sitting Article III district and circuit judges, and established to protect 
operational security and the rights of those targeted.9 In addition, a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal (CSRT) was examined, in which a tribunal reviews the case and 
                                                 
5 Mark Hosenball, “Support Grows for U.S. ‘Drone Court’ to Review Lethal Strikes,”Reuters, 
February 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-idUSBRE91800B20130209. 
6 Steven Groves, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists abroad,” The Heritage 
Foundation, April 10, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-
us-targeting-terrorists-abroad. 
7 Anna Mulrine, “Would a US ‘Drone Court’ to Authorize Drone Strikes be a Good Idea?” Christian 
Science Monitor, May 24, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/2013/0524/Would-
a-US-drone-court-to-authorize-drone-strikes-be-a-good-idea-video. 
8 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) are 
the same and used interchangeably.  
9 Amos N. Guiora and Jeffrey S. Brand, Establishment of a Drone Court: A Necessary Restraint on 
Executive Power (Salt Lake City: University of Utah College of Law, 2014), 21, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2526372. 
 xv 
determines the enemy combatant status of the detainees.10 FISC and CSRT, the two 
existing forums, were analyzed to determine if the organizational structures and 
proceedures would be viable for a drone court. The OSC hypothetical court’s 
organizational structures and procedures were also analyzed to determine the likelihood 
that it, too, could make a viable drone court.  
After analyzing the three options, the OSC had the best evaluation; this type of 
court would allow the target to have an advocate and would provide judicial oversight of 
the executive branch’s targeting before the execution of drone strikes. This hypothetical 
court structure would be staffed with federal court judges who are well versed in federal 
law processes and procedures, and constitutional law. These skills would be critical due 
to the potential constitutional issues brought before a drone court. The FISC and CSRT 
both lacked operational transparency, and neither allowed for an advocate for the target. 
While the OSC would have established processes and procedures to make it a 
strong and practicable drone court, the model would need some modifications—for 
instance, policies would need to be implemented to ensure that OSC legal procedures are 
timely (including a specific timeline in which the attorney comes aboard to represent the 
target, and a timeline for when the judges convene for a hearing). Even though the OSC 
is the closest forum for consideration as a drone court, it will need to be modified through 
the implementation of policies. The suggested modifications would ensure that 
procedural due process for U.S. citizens is implemented, the integrity of the Constitution 
preserved, and that a court has been established to ensure procedural safeguards are in 
place. 
  
                                                 
10 Alberto Gonzales, “Drones: The Power to Kill,” George Washington Law Review 82, no. 1 (2013), 
http://www.gwlr.org/gonzales/. 
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The first American targeted by a drone attack was radical Islamic cleric Anwar al-
Awlaki, who was killed in 2011. The Department of Defense (DOD) focused on Anwar 
al-Awlaki as part of a military operation that targeted U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist 
activities.1 An unintended consequence of these attacks was the confirmed deaths of three 
other U.S. citizens: Awlaki’s son Abdulrahman-al-Awlaki; Samir Khan, a controversial 
journalist; and Dr. Warren Weinstein, an American hostage.2 At no time was al-Awlaki 
or were any of three known American targets given the opportunity to be heard in court 
prior to their targeting.3 In the United States, even the most common criminals get some 
procedural legal review—whether the crime is a parking violation, shoplifting, or 
aggravated murder—to uphold the integrity of our judicial system. For example, most 
U.S. criminals must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before they are subjected 
to punishment. In drone cases, however, no review is conducted in court before it is 
determined that a U.S. citizen will be subjected to a fatal drone strike.   
On July 8, 2016, the Dallas Police Department used targeted killing to end a 
standoff with a violent gunman. It was the first time that such technology had been used 
by a domestic police force to kill a suspect.4 The suspect was killed by a MARCbot 
machine, “which was designed to tackle bombs such as [improvised explosive devices], 
                                                 
1 Jennifer K. Elsea, Legal Issues Related to the Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens Suspected of 
Terrorist Activities (CRS Report No. 7-5700) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/target.pdf. 
2 Peter Finn and Greg Miller, “Anwar al-Awlaki’s Family Speaks out against His, Son’s Deaths,” 
Washington Post, sec. National Security, October 17, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com; Robbie 
Brown and Kim Severson, “2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” September 30, 2011, New 
York Times; Adam Taylor, “The U.S. Keeps Killing Americans in Drone Strikes, Mostly by Accident,” 
Washington Post, April 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/04/23/the-
us-keeps-killing-americans-in-drone-strikes-mostly-by-accident. 
3 According to the Obama administration, only the Department of Defense can target and kill 
Americans suspected of conducting terrorism overseas. As a result, any other drone targeting is outside the 
scope of this thesis. See “White House Reportedly Struggling to Target U.S. citizens with Drone Attack,” 
Fox News, February 10, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/10/white-house-reportedly-
struggling-to-target-us-citizen-with-drone-attack.html.  




and has been used as a weapon in Iraq.”5 This machine did its lethal work within the 
United States—in a parking garage in Dallas, where the gunman, who had already 
assassinated five police officers securing a peaceful protest, was refusing to negotiate or 
surrender.6 The robot, equipped with explosives, was deployed in response to the sniper 
attack against police and, in this context, it marked a logical and legal escalation of force 
necessary to protect the public.7 The incident also raised, albeit briefly, public safety 
concerns about an unmanned vehicle targeting and killing an American citizen. Dallas is 
a portent of things to come. Because no procedure for legal review has been established 
for those targeted by drones, as seen in Dallas, they, too, are a sign of things to come—
sentencing without verdicts, trials, or even charges.  
The current process for deciding who will be targeted in military operations is 
under the authority of the DOD.8 This means that a non-judicial body decides if someone 
is subject to a drone strike. The determination is made by an interagency group selected 
by the military—not a military or civilian court—which reviews intelligence on the 
accused’s involvement in terrorist activities against the United States. Neither the accused 
nor a representative of the accused receives notification of the hearing nor is given an 
opportunity to appear before this group to present evidence for the defense. By the time 
the military reviews the case, the accused has already been designated a suspected 
terrorist and placed on the “kill list,” which means that he or she can be executed by a 
drone attack at any time. Two dozen security officials meet weekly with members of the 
executive branch to assess who will be placed on the list.9 With little public information 
about this process, however, it is unclear if this military group could later overturn the 
initial decision to place someone on the kill list or recommend that an individual not be 
placed on the list at all. Arguably, the formality of the military review creates the 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 There is an awareness of ethical implications, but it is outside the scope of this thesis. 
7 Rogers, “Dallas Police Used Bomb Robot to Kill Shooting Suspect.” 
8 Micah Zenko, “JP 3-60 Joint Targeting and U.S. Targeted Killings,” Politics, Power, and Preventive 
Action, August 5, 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/08/05/jp360-joint-targeting-and-us-targeted-
killings. 
9 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret Kill Proves a Test of Obama’s Will,” New York Times, sec. 
World, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com. 
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appearance of procedural legal review (e.g., the appellate court will review the records 
and sufficient evidence will be presented), but the actual military process is non-judicial.  
This thesis proposes a drone court that employs federal judges to weigh the 
government attorneys’ evidence.10 The drone court would allow technically versed 
judges to determine if sufficient evidence exists before a decision is made to target a U.S. 
citizen. Unlike the military review, the drone court would have an established procedure 
for legal review.  
This thesis reviews several models that could be used, in whole or in part, to 
create a drone court with the authority to decide who is eligible for fatal drone strike 
targeting. In short, the models include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC)11; the Operational Security Court (OSC), composed of current sitting Article III 
district and circuit judges, established to protect operational security and the rights of 
those targeted; and a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), in which a tribunal 
reviews the case and determines the enemy combatant status of the detainees.12 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The problem with the current process—and the problem that a drone court must 
address—is that at no time is the accused American afforded an opportunity to be heard 
prior to being targeted by the DOD for a drone attack. Based on the constitutional 
questions and the transparency problems in the targeting process, as well as the 
assumption that a newly formed drone court is a possible way to address these concerns, 
this thesis addresses the following question: What form should a drone court take? 
                                                 
10 The judges will measure the credible proof on one side of a dispute as compared with the credible 
proof on the other. See “Weight of Evidence Law and Legal Definition,”USLegal, accessed December 8, 
2016, US Legal, http://definitions.uslegal.com/w/weight-of-evidence. 
11 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
are the same and used interchangeably.  
12 Amos N. Guiora and Jeffrey S. Brand, Establishment of a Drone Court: A Necessary Restraint on 
Executive Power (Salt Lake City: University of Utah College of Law, 2014), 21, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2526372; Alberto Gonzales, “Drones: The Power to Kill,” George Washington 
Law Review 82, no. 1 (2013), http://www.gwlr.org/gonzales/. 
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In describing the DOD’s process, Martin Flaherty states, “From what we think we 
know, the procedures in place for designating someone as a [drone] target are not 
modest.”13 The DOD’s Joint Publication 30-60, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, provides public information about targeting.14 The Joint Forces Commanders must 
officially “identify” the accused as one of those on the kill list. According to Flaherty, if 
the individual is a sensitive target (as was, for example, Anwar al-Awlaki), the president 
or secretary of defense must approve the designation.15 
Critics of the current drone protocol argue that the United States risks killing 
citizens with total disregard for its own laws and policies. Those laws and policies are 
specific to the right of due process under the Fifth Amendment and executive orders 
11905 and 12333, which have banned assassinations. Under the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001) the president has broad 
power to “use all necessary and appropriate force against … persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or ordered the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001 
or … to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.”16 The current policy arguably gives the president 
a great deal of flexibility for interpreting—and implementing—the law. Specifically, the 
authorization allows the president to interpret the acts and persons involved. To an extent, 
this broad interpretation could turn citizens accused of terrorism into targets for 
assassination.   
Lieutenant Roger Herbert warns against this position, asserting that “the 
draconian practice of assassination as an instrument of foreign policy would contradict 
the United States’ democratic ideals.”17 He further states that “assassination cannot 
                                                 
13 Martin S. Flaherty, “The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and 
Judicial Safeguards,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 38, no. 1 (2016): 39. 
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting (Joint Publication 3-60) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone_dod_jp3_60.pdf.  
15 Martin S. Flaherty, “The Constitution Follows The Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and 
Judicial Safeguards,” 39.  
16 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001), 1–2. 
17 Roger Herbert, “Bullets with Names: The Deadly Dilemma” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1992), viii.  
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support long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts. Ultimately, such methods 
could weaken America’s global position.”18 The ambiguity of the president’s authority 
could undermine U.S. goals and negatively affect how allies perceive the nation. In the 
context of these urgent concerns, further investigation into a drone court as a possible 
alternative may prove fruitful. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As previously mentioned, three potential options from which to model the drone 
court exist: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Operational Security Court, 
and the Combat Status Review Tribunal.19 Most existing proposals have pointed to FISC 
as a preferred model for drone cases because the court already exists—although some 
argue that a court similar to FISC should be established and that FISC should not supply 
the actual forum. According to Neal Katyal, critics point out that “FISC’s role is to 
review cases and not to make wartime decisions.”20 FISC was established to monitor 
domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978.21 This court’s authority would have to be expanded beyond its current jurisdiction 
to hear drone cases.22  
While FISC has been in existence for several years, critics further say that the 
court is secretive, lacks transparency, is imbalanced in the area of civil liberties, and is 
biased.23 Neither Congress nor FISC has done much to ensure agency oversight. Evan 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is also referred to as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Court (FISA). Scott Shane, “Debating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes,” New York Times, 
sec. World, February 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com; Guiora and Brand, Establishment of a Drone 
Court; Alberto R. Gonzales, “Drones: The Power to Kill,”, 52. 
20 Neal K. Katyal, “Who Will Mind the Drones?” New York Times, sec. Opinion, February 20, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com. 
21 Pub. L. 95-511, 95th United States Congress, Statute at Large 92, Statute 1783.  
22 United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, accessed April 27, 2016, 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov. 
23 “Senators: End Secret Law,” Ron Wyden: Senator for Oregon, June 11, 2013, 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-end-secret-law; “Wyden Statement on 
President Obama’s Proposed Reforms to the FISC and PATRIOT ACT,” Ron Wyden: Senator for Oregon, 
August 9, 2013, https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-statement-on-President-
obamas-proposed-reforms-to-the-fisc-and-patriot-act. 
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Perez reveals that, to date, “FISC has declined just 12 of the more than 33,900 
surveillance requests made by the government in 33 years.”24 While FISC is considered a 
model for the drone court by advocate Scott Shane, who believe an FISC forum would 
provide needed congressional oversight for drone strikes, critic Garett Epps believes that 
this forum would send the federal courts into areas with which they are neither familiar 
nor, perhaps, even justified to involve themselves, such as determining military tactics.25 
Legal scholars Guiora and Brand suggest, instead, the Operational Security Court 
model.26 The court does not currently exist and would have to be established by an act of 
Congress.27 As imagined by its champions, the OSC would have jurisdiction to hear 
cases about drones and due-process violations; the established court would be staffed 
with military and JAG experts, and the president’s most senior operational security 
advisers. The executive branch senior advisers would help the president respond to 
issues, such as targeting U.S. citizens. The OSC judicial branch would review the 
decisions of the executive branch. However, if the president disagrees with the court, he 
or she could arguably overrule the court’s decision, but have to explain the action to the 
judicial branch.28 
The last model is the Combat Status Review Tribunal, which has been advocated 
by former Bush administration U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales as a model for a 
potential drone court.29 According to Gonzales, “The CSRT is an administrative process 
designed to determine whether each detainee under the control of Department of Defense 
                                                 
24 Current number of surveillance requests declined is 12, in contrast to the original number quoted by 
Evan Perez’s article. See Evan Perez, “Secret Court’s Oversight Gets Scrutiny,” Wall Street Journal, sec. 
Politics, June 9, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles; Robert D. Fram, “A Public Advocate for Privacy,” 
Inside Privacy, June 5, 2014, https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/a-public-advocate-for-privacy-1. 
25 Shane, “Debating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes”; Garrett Epps, “Why a Secret Court Won’t Solve 
the Drone Strike Problem,” = Atlantic, sec. Politics, February 16, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com. 
26 Katyal, “Who Will Mind the Drones?”; Guiora and Brand, Establishment of a Drone Court. 
27 Bill West, “National Security Court? We Already Have One,” The Investigative Project on 
Terrorism, January 26, 2009, http://www.investigative,project.org/984/national-security-court-we-already-
have-one. 
28 Guiora and Brand, Establishment of a Drone Court, 25. 
29 Gonzales, “Drones: The Power to Kill,” 52. 
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meets the criteria to be designated an enemy combatant.”30 Gonzales has suggested that 
the same processes and procedures used by the CSRT should be used for the proposed 
drone court. This model is similar to the current process in that it is dominated by 
military staff, processes, and procedures. However, unlike the status quo, in which no 
representation is provided, the CSRT does provide an advocate who can argue on the 
target’s behalf. As Gonzales points out, under the CSRT, “the advocate for the accused 
will review information relating to the target’s possible placement on the kill list and call 
witnesses on the target’s behalf.”31 He further states that “the trial will be presided over 
by an independent military judge or some other neutral decision maker, and the accused 
shall be presumed innocent unless and until the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is the hhighest standard of proof recognized under U.S. law.”32 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The drone court concept has its critics. Not all agree that a separate drone court is 
the best way to provide due process and protect the rights of American citizens. Such 
opponents as legal scholar Neal Katyal argue that the drone court would be unsuitable for 
federal judges, who are accustomed to deliberating cases in detail without such stringent 
time requirements.33 Anna Mulrine, another opponent of the drone court concept, argues 
that “drone courts would do little to change critics’ fundamental concern about drone 
strikes.”34 
This literature review analyzes the various points of view and scholarly arguments 
about the need for a drone court. This review divides the literature into four broad 
categories: assassinations (and why drone strikes are not considered assassinations), the 
                                                 
30 “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,” Department of Defense, September 26, 2006, 
archive.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf. 
31 Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 53. 
32 Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 at the German Marshall Fund, Department of Justice, October 25, 2006, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_061025.html. 
33 Katyal, “Who Will Mind the Drones?”   
34 Anna Mulrine, “Would a US ‘Drone Court’ to Authorize Drone Strikes be a Good Idea?” Christian 
Science Monitor, May 24, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/2013/0524/Would-
a-US-drone-court-to-authorize-drone-strikes-be-a-good-idea-video. 
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etymology and law of enemy combatants, self-defense and the limits of executive power, 
and U.S. citizens as drone targets and their right to due process. 
1. Assassinations  
During the Ford and Reagan administrations, assassinations were prohibited; but 
in the wake of 9/11, the president’s posture changed. While in office in 1976, President 
Gerald Ford signed Executive Order (EO) 11905, which was the first EO to ban 
assassinations. President Ford signed the EO in response to a report that the U.S. 
government was involved in several assassination attempts. EO 11905 stated, in part, that 
employees of the United States or anyone acting on their behalf were prohibited from 
conspiring to engage in assassinations; subsequently, the language was amended to be 
applicable to “all assassinations.”35 During the Reagan administration, another EO—
12333—“prohibited” engaging or conspiring to engage in assassinations.”36 The same 
language used in EO 11905 to ban assassinations was used in EO 12333.37  
During the George W. Bush administration, Stephen Knoepfler points out that 
President Bush stated his intention to “proceed with targeted killings of terrorist leaders 
or their financiers. This action was declared even though President Reagan’s EO 12333, 
which prohibited all assassinations, was still in effect.”38 Neither the Bush administration 
nor the Obama administration rescinded the executive order that prohibited 
assassinations.39 This was a rapid paradigm shift in presidential policies, from prohibiting 
assassinations to allowing targeted killings. Shortly after 9/11, President Bush stated that 
Osama bin Laden was wanted “dead or alive,” and subsequently declared “war on 
                                                 
35 Knoepfler, “Dead or Alive,” New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 5, no. 457 (2010): 
457. 
36 Ibid. 
37 “Executive Order 12333,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed December 9, 2016, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Executive-Order-12333. 
38 Knoepfler, “Dead or Alive,” 457. 
39 Ibid., 4.  
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terror.”40 Critics of the Bush administration referred to these lethally targeted actions as 
“extra-judicial executions,” while Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) stated that “U.S. 
forces had acted illegally and clearly violated the assassination ban.”41  
In language similar to President Bush’s, President-Elect Obama, just before his 
inauguration, stated his intention to capture or kill bin Laden. Moreover, early in his 
administration, President Obama appears to have “used drones in the manner consistent 
with the prior administration.”42 These drone targets are known as targeted killings. 
Neither Presidents Bush nor Obama used the term “assassination” when talking about 
targeted killings. However, specific people were targeted through the use of drones; it 
could be argued that this does, in fact, fit the definition of “assassination.”  
Although President Ford and Reagans’ EOs address assassination, the term is not 
clearly defined, and has resultantly been interpreted in various ways.43 In each instance, 
when an administration targeted and killed terrorist leaders or financiers—such as Uday 
and Qusay Hussein, Anwar al-Awlaki, or Osama bin Laden—it could be argued that 
because the lives taken were of politically prominent people, that an assassination 
occurred. Although Stephen Knoepfler points out that there is “no universally accepted 
definition of assassination,” it could be argued that targeted drone killings carried out 
without proper legal authority are assassinations.44 In contrast, targeted drone killings 
performed under authority of law to preserve the security of a nation are not deemed 
assassinations. 
Drone attacks may not be deemed assassinations because they are authorized and, 
as previously discussed, protected by law. Because of the broad statutory authority given 
                                                 
40 Toby Harnden, “Bin Laden is Wanted: Dead or Alive,” Telegraph, sec. World News, Asia, 
Afghanistan, September 18, 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk; Pierre Tristain, “Full Text: President Bush 
Declares ‘War on Terror,’” About News and Issues, December 17, 2014, 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech.htm. 
41 Mollo, “The United States and Assassination Policy,” 3. 
42 Knoepfler, “Dead or Alive,” 458. 
43 Exec. Order No. 12, 333 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981). 
44 Knoepfler, “Dead or Alive,” 458. 
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to the president under the AUMF, he has the discretion to execute drone attacks and 
appropriate force whenever he deems it necessary to fight the war on terror.45 
2. The Etymology and Law of Enemy Combatants 
In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the United States Supreme Court, amid 
World War II, addressed a situation in which “four men were captured on American soil 
and accused of acts in violation of the Articles of War. Under this act, their crimes were 
to be tried in front of a military tribunal, and they were not afforded a trial in civil court. 
A tribunal did not afford a person all of the rights afforded under the United States 
Constitution.”46 The men, who were born in Germany but had lived in the United States, 
were caught on shore and detained due to allegations that they had planned to destroy war 
industries and war facilities in the United States. The issue revolved around the 
constitutionality of a presidential order to try war crimes committed by enemy 
belligerents (i.e., enemy combatants) in a military tribunal instead of a civil court.47 The 
Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the military tribunal of the United States over 
the German “enemy invaders or saboteurs” of the United States.48  
Ex parte Quirin has been cited as a precedent for the military court trial of an 
unlawful combatant. The Supreme Court, in deciding that the president had authority to 
detain or try enemy combatants, stated: 
The President’s power over enemies, who enter this country in time of 
war, as armed invaders intending to commit hostile acts, must be absolute. 
In his Proclamation, the President took the action he deemed necessary to 
deal with persons he and the armed forces under his command reasonably 
believed to be enemy invaders. He declared that all such persons should be 
subject to the law of war and triable by military tribunals. He removed 
whatever privilege such persons might otherwise have had to seek any 
remedy or maintain any proceeding in the courts of the United States. 
These acts were clearly within his power as Commander in Chief and 
Chief Executive and were lawful acts of the sovereign Government of the 
                                                 
45 “Authorization for the Use of Military Force,” FindLaw, accessed December 9, 2016, 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/sjres23.enr.html. 
46 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
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United States in time of war. The prisoners are enemies who fall squarely 
within the terms of the President’s proclamation.49 
The Supreme Court’s decision points out that military clothing or uniform is an 
insufficient criterion to render a captive a prisoner of war, even during World War II, 
when the purpose was to spy on and destroy property in the United States.  
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), “Hamdi was deemed an enemy combatant because 
he was among members of the Taliban terrorist group when he was captured: Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was captured by members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of 
military groups opposed to the Taliban government and eventually turned over to the 
United States military.”50 Hamdi was accused of fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and 
initially detained and interrogated in Afghanistan. He was subsequently 
transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in January 
2002 as the government contended that Hamdi was an enemy combatant 
of the United States. … The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the AUMF 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld confirmed that Congress in the AUMF gave its 
express approval to the military conflict against al Qaeda and its allies and 
thereby to the President’s use of all traditional and accepted incidents of 
force in this current military conflict.”51 
However, while the Supreme Court reaffirmed its support of the president’s inherent 
authority through the AUMF to protect the nation, it simultaneously adhered to Justice 
O’Connor’s admonition that a “state of war is not a blank check for the President.”52 
Then, unlike the “Ex parte Quirin case, in which the four petitioners were ruled enemy 
combatants and tried by a military tribunal,” the Supreme Court ruled that “Hamdi, a U.S. 
citizen, was entitled to due process and had the right to challenge his enemy combatant 
status before an impartial court.”53  
                                                 
49 Ibid.  
50 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/ 
542/507.html. 
51 “Legal Authorities,” U.S. Department of Justice. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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During the Bush administration, it was determined that no matter the state 
affiliation of the terrorists, they were deemed “enemy combatants and legitimate targets 
of lethal force in the ‘war on terror.’”54 Since President Bush’s administration, the term 
“enemy combatant” has been applied to Americans suspected of terrorism, as reflected in 
the status of al-Awlaki.55 
3. Self-Defense and the Limits of Executive Power 
Some government officials argue that targeting U.S. citizens is justifiable.56 This 
point of view appears to be affirmed by David Barron, acting assistant attorney general 
for the Department of Justice (DOJ). In an unclassified DOJ memo, Barron states that it 
is justifiable to target a U.S. citizen on foreign soil who has participated in recent 
activities that pose a possible threat to the United States. He argues that lethal targeting is 
justifiable if there is no evidence to indicate the individual has renounced his or her 
intention to attack the United States.57  
The Supreme Court, in evaluating the AUMF’s role in the 2004 Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld case, recognized that the “national security underpinnings of the ‘war on 
terror,’ although crucial, were broad and malleable”; this indistinct basis also leaves the 
AUMF open to “being altered or influenced to change” important constitutional 
safeguards, which is of concern for Congress.58 As an illustration, “the broad language of 
the AUMF affords the President ... [the] discretion to use all ... traditional and accepted 
                                                 
54 Mollo, “The United States and Assassination Policy,”24. 
55 Andrew C. McCarthy, “Obama OK’s Targeted Assassination of Awlaki, a U.S. Citizen,” National 
Review, April 7, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/197534/obama-oks-targeted-assassination-
awlaki-us-citizen-andrew-c-mccarthy. 
56 David J. Barron, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal 
Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 2010), 21; “Just Department Memo Reveals Legal Case 
for Drone Strikes on American,” NBC news, http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/ 
16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-Amerlcans, 21.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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incidents of the use of military force.”59 This pliable language is part of the president’s 
apparent authority to defend and protect the nation.  
Even further, some scholars assert the primacy of the United States’ right to self-
defense over individual rights. Steven Groves of the Heritage Foundation’s Freedom 
Project argues that the United States has an inherent right to self-defense—even if it 
means that a U.S. citizen is the target. In Groves’ white paper, he reiterates that this right 
is implied if the U.S. citizen is deemed a threat against other citizens and the security of 
the nation.60 He concludes that if there is “an imminent threat from a U.S. citizen, under 
the circumstances, no formal congressional authorization for declaration of war, 
authorization for the use of neither military force nor acknowledgment of armed conflict 
under international law will be necessary in order to secure our nation.”61 Groves 
believes that, for the United States to ensure terrorist organizations do not successfully 
attack the nation again, the U.S. government should preserve the option of using all tools, 
which arguably include drones.62 Groves, in making this assessment, relies on Article V 
of the Washington Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United States “Right of Self-Defense,” which reads, 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”63 The AUMF gives the executive branch flexibility to conduct self-defense, 
and NATO supports the right of member states to act in self-defense.  
In contrast to Barron and Groves’ arguments, some scholars believe that the 
DOD’s targeting of U.S. citizens is not an inherent matter for the executive branch. 
                                                 
59 “Legal Authorities Supporting Activities,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2. 
60 Steven Groves, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists abroad,” The Heritage 




63 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Article 51 of the Charter of the United States, Right of 
Self-Defense, (1945), accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16937.htm. 
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Scholars in this camp, such as Alberto Gonzales, “propose additional measures that 
the … president can take to ensure that the procedures comply with constitutional 
guarantees of due process.”64 Moreover, Gonzales argues that “determining the scope of 
the president’s power in a time of war or armed conflict is one of the most difficult 
separation-of-powers questions to answer in constitutional law.”65 According to 
Gonzales, “There are three possible sources of authority under domestic law guiding the 
president’s decision to unilaterally designate an American citizen as an enemy combatant 
and to place him on the kill list: express constitutional authority, implied constitutional 
authority, and statutory authority from Congress.”66 In addition, Gonzales emphasizes the 
need for Congress and the president to propose additional measures to ensure that, if 
American citizens are placed on the list of targets for drone strikes, such procedures 
comply with constitutional guarantees.67  
These arguments all trace back to fundamental questions about the bounds of 
executive authority. In 1952, the Supreme Court established that the president could not 
overstep the congressional limits of his authority, even during wartime, when it heard 
Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer.68 In 1951, when the United States went to 
war with Korea, labor unrest threatened the day-to-day functions of the Youngstown steel 
manufacturing plant. President Truman had judged the Youngstown Plant to be critical 
infrastructure for the war effort, so when a strike occurred, he issued an executive order 
to block it. Youngstown was decided in 1952, and the case continues to be the standard 
from which executive determinations are made in response to the president’s overreach 
and Congress’ limits upon his office. In a much-cited concurring opinion, the test Justice 
Jackson gave to determine the extent of executive authority is three-part: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 
                                                 




68 Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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2. When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but 
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, 
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least 
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent 
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.69 
The Youngstown criteria are more difficult to establish than Jackson’s language might 
imply. Proponents of drone strikes overseas in the course of the war in Afghanistan, 
echoing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdi, posit that the AUMF represents the 
express sanction of Congress—the muscular executive action in this matter. 
Opponents and those who see clearer limits to the extent of executive authority—
picking up the other strand of the Supreme Court’s Hamdi decision—insist that the real 
issue is the individual citizen’s right to due process before being subject to lethal 
targeting. Deborah Pearlstein discusses this point in her issue brief: 
The Court has recognized that an after-the-fact civil suit for damages may 
be all the process due when no pre-deprivation hearing could have made a 
difference, as in a death the state caused accidentally, or in exigent 
circumstances. But, where, as in many targeting operations, the state 
deliberately plans in advance to deprive an individual of life, (e.g., 
administering the death penalty) it regularly provides a set of procedures 
that dwarf those offered in any Court’s standard due process cases.70  
 
 
                                                 
69 Ibid., Case Brief Summary, S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952), l. 
70 Deborah Pearlstein, Enhancing Due Process in Targeted Killing (Washington, DC: American 
Constitution Society, 2013), 2, https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Pearlstein_-_Due_Process 
_in_Targeted_Killing.pdf. 
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4. Due Process and Liberty 
The current drone targeting of U.S. citizens seeks to exact the death penalty 
without providing the due process procedures required by the Constitution. The scene in 
the Dallas parking garage described previously raises similar concerns. Pearlstein notes 
that, even if the Constitution were not applicable under the circumstances of the drone 
strikes overseas, “any government agency must pursue some kind of process before 
engaging in lethal targeting operations.”71  
Some constitutional experts and such legal scholars as Benjamin Wittes do at least 
agree that a process must be in place to undergird and protect due process rights.72 
However, there remains disagreement about the manner in which the drone targeting 
should be addressed. Pearlstein assesses that procedural safeguards should be in place 
before targeting while Gonzales argues that the decision to execute drone attacks resides 
in the president’s executive authority.73 Pearlstein is convinced there is a gap in the 
process, while Groves maintains that the United States has an inherent right to defend 
itself, even if it means a U.S. citizen is targeted.74 
Carol Lee and Dion Nissenbaum point out that the death of American hostage 
Warren Weinstein and U.S. citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and Abdulrahman al-Awlaki 
reveal a significant disparity between the government’s professed stringent standards 
for drone targeting and the standard that is actually being used.75 The first standard is 
one in which terrorist suspects are put on the kill list and presidential signoff is 
required.76 The other standard is known as a “signature strike,” in which, as explained 
by Arianna Huffington, the suspected terrorist is targeted based upon an exhibition of 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 3.  
72 Wittes, “On Due Process and Targeting Citizens.” 
73 Pearlstein, “Enhancing Due Process in Targeted Killing,”The American Constitution Society for 
Law and Policy,” 3; Alberto R. Gonzales, “Drones: The Power to Kill,” 19. 
74 Steven Groves, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad,” 6. 
75 Carol E. Lee, Dion Nissenbaum, Damian Paletta, and Kristina Peterson, “Obama’s Drone-Strike 
Rules to Be Reviewed,” Wall Street Journal, sec. Politics, April 23, 2015, http://www.wsj.com. 
76 Ibid. 
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suspicious patterns, such as associating with al-Qaeda.77 In the signature strike, Lee 
and Nissenbaum point out that the military makes the decision and the president’s 
approval is not required.78 It was a “signature strike” that killed the American hostage 
Warren Weinstein.79 Similarly, Peter Grier calls the entire targeting selection process 
“vague,” Benjamin Friedman calls it a “secret process,” and Dylan Matthew cites his 
colleague Greg Miller: “The administration uses something called the ‘disposition 
matrix’ to determine targets for drone strikes”; Miller describes it as a “single, 
continually evolving database in which biographies, locations, known associates and 
affiliated organizations are all cataloged.”80 Ultimately, the process by which U.S. 
targets are selected for drone attacks has many names and faces many challenges.  
The scholars’ overarching concern is if the liberties of the individual outweigh the 
security of the nation or vice-versa. Judge Richard A. Posner argues that “rights should 
be modified according to circumstance and that we must find a pragmatic balance 
between personal liberty and community service.”81 Professor Daniel J. Solove argues 
against piling too many assumptions on either side of that balance, noting that we “do not 
have to choose security over individual privacy or vice-versa because protecting privacy 
isn’t fatal to security measures; it merely involves adequate oversight and regulation.”82  
                                                 
77 Arianna Huffington, “‘Sinature Strikes’ and the President’s Empty Rhetoric on Drones,” Huffington 
Post, July 10, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com. 
78 Lee et al, “Obama’s Drone-Strike Rules to Be Reviewed.” 
79 Huffington, “Signature Strikes.” 
80 Peter Grier, “Can Drone Strikes Target US Citizens? Critics Say Rules are Vague,” Christian 
Monitor, sec. Politics, February 5, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com; Benjamin H. Friedman, “Drone Policy 
Must Include Checks and Balances,” U.S. News and World Report, February 6, 2013, 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dronw-policy-must-include-checks-and-balances; Dylan 
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Wonkblog, March 8, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/08/everything-you-
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Oxford University Press, 2006). 
82 Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Trade-off between Privacy and Security (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2011), https://www.danielsolove.com/nothing-to-hide. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze, identify, and propose alternative forums 
to allow targeted U.S. citizens access to a court-like process involving constitutional 
protections. Although a military process is currently in place, the function of the 
proposed alternative forum would be to address what the current military process lacks—
due process and transparency. This research explores innovative processes and 
methodologies that will help strengthen the current procedure or assist in creating a new 
one. Moreover, the proposed alternative will help ensure that constitutional and 
procedural safeguards are in place to protect civil liberties. 
Policy options analysis (POA) provides a framework for assessing criteria that are 
important to the foundation of a drone-court system, “to provide greater accountability 
for drone strikes domestically and internationally.”83 Moreover, the POA serves to 
evaluate and address the constitutional issues surrounding presidential and judicial 
authority. Under the assumption that the current policy is flawed or dysfunctional, a POA 
can help identify and address those flaws. Also, this approach involves looking into the 
future and making a recommendation based on alternatives. The POA method works well 
to examine future policy options, while other analysis methods focus on the present. In 
short, the POA involves taking into consideration different alternatives and 
recommending those associated with the best outcomes. 
The POA approach involves defining the problem, constructing alternative 
forums, projecting the outcomes, and choosing the best solution. The criteria used within 
the POA approach to compare and contrast the models include procedural accuracy, the 
legal differences of the various forums, transparency, speed of decision-making, and 
judges and legal representation, as well as the procedure for legal review by which each 
forum is regulated. Each forum is discussed and compared against the status quo. 
In Chapter II, the role of FISC as a drone court is explored, along with the 
structural changes that would need to occur before it could be an effective forum for 
drone cases. Chapter III examines the OSC as a drone court. The OSC, unlike FISC, does 
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not exist and would have to be created by an act of Congress. As part of the OSC’s 
creation, Congress and executive staff would play an increased role in decision-making. 
In Chapter IV, the Combat Status Review Tribunal is reviewed. The CSRT, unlike FISC, 
allows the accused to be heard before a judge, but the court structure is a military 
tribunal. The analysis is presented in Chapter V, followed by conclusions and 
recommendations in Chapter VI. This policy options analysis provides important, deeper 
insight into the pivotal issues concerning drone strikes against U.S. citizens in a drone 
court forum and the prospective role of each court in addressing them. 
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II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 
FISC has been in existence for close to 40 years, and the court’s history has not 
been without controversy. In the beginning, according to Charles Savage and Laura 
Poitras, the court primarily approved wiretap requests. It has since evolved to “engaging 
in a [more] complex analysis of the law,” so government agencies can rationalize 
collecting American’s private information, such as emails and phone metadata.84 After 
9/11, as part of the war on terror, the Bush administration weakened restrictions in the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which allowed government agencies to 
request access to personal information on private citizens such as emails and telephone 
numbers.85 However, the court has established itself as a well-tested forum for 
guaranteeing procedure for legal review while remaining secretive. Furthermore, the 
court is a viable option because it is an established legal forum from which prospective 
drone issues could be heard without a major overhaul to its process.  
This chapter examines what is known about the cases brought before FISC, the 
secrecy surrounding its procedures, the timeframe in which the issues are heard and speed 
of decision-making, the role and responsibility of FISC judges, and the current procedure 
for legal review.   
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1978, Congress established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under 
FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1801–1885c, to approve applications for government surveillance.86 
When Congress established the court, the United States was still in the throes of the Cold 
War, and “foreign spying, not terrorism, was the main focus.”87 According to the FISC 
website, “The Court sits in Washington, DC, and is composed of eleven federal district 
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court judges who are designated by the Chief Justice of the United States. Each judge 
serves for a maximum of seven years and their terms are staggered to ensure continuity 
on the Court.”88 In accordance with FISA, judges rotate one week at a time and have to 
represent a minimum of seven U.S. judicial circuits.89    
The court hears cases for a broad range of issues but does not have to share 
anything with the public. As described on the Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
FISC’s official website:     
FISC has jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to applications for, and to 
issue orders [for] authorizing four traditional FISA activities such as 
electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap surveillance and 
compelled production of business records. … Records from FISC hearings 
are not revealed, even to petitioners challenging surveillance orders under 
the court rules. The FISC has the discretion to publish its opinions.90   
In recent years, the court has received increased criticism due to publicly perceived bias 
and lack of transparency.91 For example, one of the main criticisms about the court is that 
it approves the majority of government requests without disclosing its procedure.92 This 
perceived lack of transparency occurred primarily because, when FISC was initially 
established, it performed wiretaps and later evolved to electronic surveillance and secret 
bulk collection of personal data on Americans.93    
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
FISC rarely, if ever, denies a government request for foreign intelligence warrants 
from such agencies as the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency (NSA). Conor Clarke 
affirms this criticism: “A striking feature of proceedings at the Foreign Intelligence 
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Surveillance Court … is that the executive always wins.”94 Critic Robert D. Fram further 
asserts that, over the court’s 33-year span and 35,651 requests, only 12 requests have 
been denied.95 Amos N. Guiora and Jeffrey S. Brand corroborate this 99.9 percent 
approval statistic and attribute it to the fact that FISC is really just an extension of the 
executive branch.96 They further assert that the executive branch controls the information 
that the secretive court receives, and that judges use when deciding if the same executive 
branch can pursue surveillance in a given case. Guiora and Brand point out that, while the 
judges are well meaning, their ability to “search for credible and reliable facts” is 
inhibited because the hearings are non-adversarial, which means that only one party—in 
this case, the government—is present, and the defendant is never summoned.97   
Jennifer Granick and Christopher Sprigman argue that FISC “has a strong 
practical incentive to find a way to say ‘yes’ to the government.”98 They point out that 
FISC assesses the requests from the various agencies “knowing that the government is 
heavily committed to mass surveillance already and has been for a long time.”99 They 
further state that this propensity to acquiesce to the executive branch’s requests for 
surveillance has been illustrated by the administration’s ability to collect, for years, 
personal data on Americans. Moreover, it has been done without a warrant.100 Arguably, 
under FISC, the executive branch—in conjunction with the NSA—has exhibited broad 
authority to conduct surveillance. For example, during the Bush administration, the NSA 
implemented the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), which broadened the scope of 
American data that the government could access.101 The TSP allowed for grand-scale 
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warrantless surveillance; according to Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel, “After 9/11, 
Congress passed the Patriot Act to expand the tools available to the government to 
combat terrorism.”102 In other words, the TSP was implemented shortly after 9/11 and 
was instrumental in opening the door for the surveillance of Americans without prior 
judicial review. This was not the case prior to 9/11.103   
The administration was challenged on its use of the TSP in American Civil 
Liberties Union et al. v. National Security Agency et al., l493 F. 3d 644 (2007).104 In 
2006, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit against the NSA, alleging that the 
NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program was unconstitutional. However, in July 2007, 
the 6th Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue because “they could not 
state with certainty that they had been wiretapped by the NSA. The case went to the 
Supreme Court in February 2008, but the court declined to review the challenge.”105 In 
other words, the substantive issue was never decided.106 The TSP persists, yet its method 
of operation has not been sanctioned by a court of review.  
C. LEGAL/PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
This section examines what is known about the type of cases the FISC court 
reviews, the lack of transparency in which it operates, the timeliness of the process, the 
role and responsibility of FISC judges, and the current procedure for legal review. 
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Over the years, FISC has become increasingly complicated; the court has grown 
beyond the boundaries for which Congress originally envisioned it. According to Dia 
Kayyali, FISC’s expansion has created a massive body of “secret policy and legal 
precedent.”107 She explains:  
The court is no longer simply approving applications but regularly 
assessing broad constitutional questions … [that establish] important 
judicial precedents with almost no public scrutiny. What Congress 
originally authorized...was an expedited system of approving 
individualized warrants for foreign surveillance of specified individuals—
much like what regular magistrate judges do with warrants now, with 
safeguards built for the national security context.108 
In other words, FISC’s role was to approve applications for warrants, not to adjudicate.   
Along this same line, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed the 
FISC’s approval of NSA metadata collection.109 Mears and Abdullah state that the 
government approved metadata collection from Verizon, Apple, Google, and other 
internet giants.110 In the process of approving the collection of what could be argued as 
personal information, the judges went beyond their original mission to issue orders for 
surveillance—they delved into the personal and private information of the public at large, 
such as detailed phone records. As a result, when judges go beyond their original 
mission, as Mears and Abdullah describe it, they are “reinterpreting the Constitution.”111 
In other words, FISC judges were authorized to approve surveillance and ended up 
expanding their own authority by approving the government’s secret collection of private 
information.112 The problem with FISC is that the Constitution, as well as the 
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constitutional limits of privacy and due process, are malleable under the judges’ 
discretion.113   
Furthermore, according to Stanley, unlike most courts, FISC lacks the 
administrative capacity to issue violations, but it can issue orders that are part of the 
government’s application process. To illustrate, FISA is not an “administration agency 
like the [Environmental Protection Agency] or [United States Department of 
Agruculture] that have inspectors on the ground (e.g., issue violations) able to watch over 
an operation and verify first-hand exactly what is taking place.”114 Moreover, in a 
traditional court, a judge requires the parties to report back on efforts to comply with a 
court order, or the judge relies on an aggrieved party to bring to his or her attention to the 
other party’s failure to comply. This is not, however, the case with FISC; it neither issues 
citations nor has an aggrieved party reporting back to them on the other party’s failure to 
comply. As a result, FISA has no idea if the FBI or NSA is complying with its orders, 
because the orders go into a “black hole.”115 For example, when FISC allowed the NSA 
to obtain metadata, which went beyond “the original scope of authorized [metadata] 
acquisition [order],” FISC was unaware that the NSA had not complied with the 
previously agreed-upon FISC order.116 On the other hand, Stanley argues that black holes 
are not as much an issue in an adversarial proceeding, “where the aggrieved party will 
notify the judge if the court’s orders are not being followed.”117 Stanley further states 
that the NSA has been doing this for years and has a very poor record of complying with 
FISC court orders.118  
                                                 
113 Ibid. 
114 Jay Stanley, “FISA Court’s Problems Run Deep and More Than Tinkering Is Required,” American 





118 Ibid.  
 27 
FISC’s overall system lacks the transparency critical to increasing the public’s 
awareness of how the court functions. In response to this concern, Congress initiated an 
inquiry concerning potential changes to the FISC’s law and practice.119  
Judge John D. Bates, the former presiding judge for FISC, responded with a letter 
to Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee.120 In letter, he 
discussed several points and opposed the court’s need to become more transparent 
through public disclosure, arguing that further public disclosure would only increase the 
public’s confusion.121 He explains that such disclosure is “not likely to enhance the 
public’s understanding of FISA’s implementation and that the release of freestanding 
summaries of court opinions [is] likely to promote [public] confusion and 
misunderstanding.”122  
Overall, while FISC’s proceedings are shrouded in secrecy, the rules governing 
the proceedings, such as FISC’s Rules of Procedure, are publicly available. Moreover, the 
public has access to the FISC Proceedings on the FISC website.123  
2. Timeliness  
FISC’s Rules of Procedure “are promulgated pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1803(g), 
govern all of the court’s proceedings.”124 The rules are straightforward concerning the 
manner and timeframe in which proceedings should occur. For example, Rule 9, Time 
and Manner of Submission of Applications, states: 
(a) Proposed Applications. Except when an application is being 
submitted following an emergency authorization pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1805(e), 1824(e), 1843, 188lb(d), or 18 81 c( d) (“emergency 
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authorization”), or as otherwise permitted by the Court, proposed 
applications must be submitted by the government no later than seven 
days before the government seeks to have the matter entertained by the 
Court. Proposed applications submitted following an emergency 
authorization must be submitted as soon after such authorization as is 
reasonably practicable.125  
Another provision under 50 U.S.C. 1805(e), Emergency Orders, is related to the 
seven-day timeframe in which a procedure is to be performed. The language is more 
subjective because the attorney general is able to alter the speed of procedures based 
upon his or her determination. As an illustration, 50 U.S.C. 1805(e) reads:   
The Attorney General may authorize specific emergency employment of 
electronic surveillance if the Attorney General “reasonably believes” that 
an emergency exists, “reasonably determines” that a factual basis exists 
for the emergency order, he subsequently can inform the judge of the 
decision made, and the Attorney General makes an application … as soon 
as practicable, but not later than seven days after the authorization for the 
surveillance by the Attorney General.126 
The statute also reads, “When the application for the order is denied, or after the 
expiration of seven days from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, 
whichever is earliest … the Attorney General still has the authority to assess 
compliance.”127  
Because FISC operates under established processes and procedures, it could be 
argued that FISC’s timeframes are reasonable and sufficient. As an illustration, the FISC 
emergency order uses the seven-day window for making immediate decisions if, 
according to the statute, the attorney general “reasonably determines that an emergency 
exists,” or if the judge determines there is probable cause for an order.128 However, there 
are challenges concerning the timeframe in which judges can adequately review each 
case.  
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While FISC may have established procedural rules to ensure timeliness of the 
process, one area that may challenge timeliness pertains to the rotational basis on which 
FISC judges work. Arguably, the lack of continuity could interfere with the judges’ 
ability to have the requisite time to review and become familiar with the intricacies of 
each prospective case. In response to Senator Patrick J. Leahy’s inquiry concerning FISC 
operations, Judge Bates stated that the judges have the support of other attorneys and 
legal staff to assist in evaluating applications.129 However, Bates points out that “at the 
discretion of the presiding judge, some of the court’s more complex or time-consuming 
matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week system.”130 In short, a problem 
with FISC concerning timeliness of the process centers on if the assigned judges have 
sufficient time and opportunity to review, to evaluate applications or cases, and to 
perform these tasks.  
3. Judges and Legal Representation 
According to Judge Reggie B. Walton, the role of FISC judges and the staff is to 
make determinations. The determinations are based on factors such as whether or not the 
applications reviewed and evaluated have met the statutory legal requirements for a 
“proposed application for an order for surveillance, or similarly related FISC activity.”131 
Walton acknowledges that additional legal responsibilities, as part of the process are to 
seek additional information, and clarity, if needed. Walton further asserts that once the 
initial contact is made, the staff attorney drafts a written analysis and points out any 
application issues. Subsequently, the judge then reviews the proposed application in light 
of the attorney’s analysis.132  
Walton points out that even though the attorney plays a pivotal role in assisting 
the FISC judge, the judge still has a great deal of discretion in determining ifnan 
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application will be approved.133 Walton affirms this by referring to the rules, which state 
in part,  
In conjunction with its submission of a final application, the government 
has the opportunity to request a hearing, even if the judge did not 
otherwise intend to require one … if the judge schedules a hearing, the 
judge decides whether to approve the application thereafter. Otherwise, 
the judge makes a determination based on the final written application 
submitted by the government.134  
Overall, based on Judge Walton’s assessment of their current role, FISC judges have 
broad discretion to accept or deny the applications brought before them.135 However, 
suggested congressional reform to the court’s status quo may be a challenge for some of 
the judiciary, as explained by Judge Bates in his letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein.136 
Bates claims that suggested changes would increase the court’s work. Even with 
increased resources in finances, personnel, and such, Walter explains that increases 
would be logistically problematic for the court’s operations. Bates states that these 
changes will be “disruptive to the court’s ability to perform their duties, including 
responsibilities under FISA and the Constitution to ensure that the privacy interests of 
United States citizens and others are adequately protected.”137 For example, FISC would 
have to undergo structural changes, such as increasing the number of applications the 
judges will have to review, even if additional personnel are brought aboard. Judge Bates 
concludes by stating that such changes would drastically transform the foundation of 
FISC “to the detriment of its current responsibilities.”138 Arguably, the FISC judges 
prefer the status quo, in contrast to any prospective FISC reform bills that could be 
introduced by Congress.  
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4. Procedure for Legal Review  
The procedure for legal review under the current FISC is very narrow in scope; 
presently, FISA court judges “weigh the reliability of intelligence information in 
determining whether to grant government ex-parte requests for wire-tapping warrants.”139 
To illustrate, ex-parte proceedings occur when only one side is present, typically the 
government. The NSA and FBI often go before a FISC judge, in ex-parte proceedings, to 
obtain orders for surveillance.140 Because of the ex-parte nature of the review, those who 
are the targets of the surveillance are not only unaware, but they also lack legal 
representation at this proceeding and, thus, the ability to challenge the application. 
While it could be argued that the ex-parte proceeding falls short of providing a 
safeguard for protecting procedural due process (e.g., the right to an attorney), Bates 
disagrees. He argues that having an advocate “would not create a true adversarial 
process” (i.e., involving opposing parties) and that such appointment (i.e., through 
congressional reform) would not be “constructive in helping the court to assess the 
facts.”141 In his letter to Senator Feinstein, he states: 
The participation of a privacy advocate is unnecessary and could prove 
counter-productive in the vast majority of FISA matters, which involve the 
application of a probable cause or other factual standard to case-specific 
facts and typically implicate the interests of few persons other than the 
specified target. Given the nature of FISA proceedings, the participation of 
an advocate would neither create a truly adversarial process nor 
constructively assist the Courts in assessing the facts, as the advocate 
would be unable to communicate with the target or conduct an 
independent investigation.142 
Bates further asserts his ambivalence on having an advocate for FISC, stating “aadvocate 
involvement in run-of-the-mill FISA matters would substantially hamper the work of the 
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Courts without providing any countervailing benefit in terms of privacy protection or 
otherwise.”143 Bates concludes by stating that “indeed, such pervasive participation could 
actually undermine the Courts’ ability to receive complete and accurate information on 
the matters before them.”144 In other words, there may be a flaw in FISA’s procedures, 
but if the status quo were to change, this change could prevent the court from operating 
as it should. 
According to Stanley, whether FISC has an ex-parte proceeding or not, the court 
will still have problems. Stanley states that appointing an advocate will not help a court, 
which lacks the “administrative capability to have boots-on-the-ground verification of its 
rulings.”145 It could be argued, whether or not the court has ex-parte or advocate 
(adversarial) proceedings, it still lacks the capacity to verify if an agency, such as the 
NSA, has complied with the rulings. 
D. CONCLUSION 
FISC has many years of experience on which to build pertaining to how a court 
should operate, even if the court operates in a shroud of secrecy and the public lacks 
understanding about its functions. Furthermore, because the judges rotate on a regular 
basis, it is unclear how timely the processes and procedures are for issuing orders, 
making decisions, and for determining if agencies are complying with the orders. 
Moreover, the judges’ decisions must be made immediately, which means they may not 
be sufficiently deliberated or vetted. In addition, the procedure for legal review is 
lukewarm because the burden of proof for FISC is low. Before the court approves an 
order, it relies on the evidence of the FBI, CIA and NSA on the justification for the order. 
Also, the procedure is ex-parte concerning the requests; only the government comes 
before the court to discuss what the government should do.  
Ultimately, all of these procedures are shrouded in a problematic canopy of 
secrecy. But, in spite of its flaws, FISC has been advantageously standing and 
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functioning as an agency for close to 40 years. FISC has a structure in place, in which a 
hearing—though one sided—can be held; judges are established, and federal procedural 
guidelines are in place. The disadvantage is that FISC’s current structure is flawed and 
lacks procedural safeguards concerning a target’s right to notice and legal representation 
when they are subject to surveillance. FISC has the potential for becoming a stronger and 
more transparent institution. These improvements could take place through congressional 
reform or an act of Congress.146 If nothing more, FISC is a good model of how a court 
should not operate.147 
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III. THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY COURT (OSC) 
This chapter discusses the Operational Security Court (OSC). The OSC is a 
theoretical court conceived by Amos Guiora and Jeffrey Brand.148 If established, the 
proposed OSC forum would review drone cases solely. Moreover, the OSC would 
involve itself in the drone decision cycle before the determination is made. For the OSC 
to become a reality, it would have to be established, according to Bill West, by an act of 
Congress.149 Building the court from the ground up provides a unique opportunity to 
address due-process concerns associated with the current model, the role of the executive 
branch in the decision-making process, and the need for congressional oversight to 
increase transparency and awareness of the process.150 
One of the problems this chapter addresses is when the executive branch should 
make a determination on targeting the terrorist suspect. For example, Guiora and Brand 
argue that the executive branch should have supporting documentation to substantiate the 
decision before the actual targeting occurs. This chapter also addresses other issues 
related to the OSC, such as its interaction with the executive branch, transparency, 
timeliness of the process, the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to legal representation as well as to procedure for legal review.151 
A. BACKGROUND 
Guiora and Brand have recommended the creation of a court designed especially 
for the purpose of hearing drone-targeting cases—to review executive branch intelligence 
information before a determination is made to target a U.S. citizen.152 The court’s 
fundamental function would be to analyze and assess the information prior to the 
execution of a targeted attack “in order to determine whether the planned attack comports 
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with judicial standards and criteria.”153 In other words, the intelligence information that 
is used to justify the targeting of U.S. citizens must be substantiated through judicial 
review. Guiora and Brand’s “hypothetical fact scenario” is used in this thesis to illustrate 
how the court will work.154   
The role of the OSC is initiated when a U.S. target who has been under 
surveillance moves toward enacting a terror plot. In other words, based on intelligence, 
he or she is in the final stages of the planning process. Once the individual is identified as 
a “legitimate target,” the executive branch “orders the CIA and the Department of 
Defense to make necessary arrangements for a drone attack at the earliest feasible 
opportunity.”155 Also at this stage, the executive branch will “notify” the OSC and 
request a hearing.156  
Those who will attend the OSC hearings include the target’s counsel, who has 
received clearance to view classified information, and a tribunal of judges, who will 
immediately schedule the hearing.157 Additionally, if the judges from the district court 
and the court of appeals are not in physical proximity to the hearing, the hearing will be 
conducted through secured, closed-circuit channels.158 At the trial, a senior official from 
the Department of Defense or another designated agency will present all relevant 
intelligence against the target.159 Intelligence analysts and senior operational 
commanders will be “subject to cross-examination by the target’s attorney.”160 Each side 
will have an opportunity to “fully present their respective cases,” although the target is 
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arbitrarily assigned counsel without his or her knowledge. As a result, even though the 
attorney appears and tests the evidence presented against the target, the target is unaware 
that the proceedings are even occurring and plays no role in them.161 While the hearing 
will not be open to the public, the rulings will be publicly available if the information is 
unclassified. Rulings containing classified information will be redacted.162  
The OSC will use a standard known as the “Operational Strict Scrutiny 
standard.”163 Under this standard, the court determines the reliability of the intelligence 
and the information submitted against the target, as well as if there is “corroborating 
evidence” to justify the decision to kill the target with a drone strike.164 In addition, the 
OSC drone court will have an appellate division for appeals if the target’s attorney wants 
to challenge the OSC’s decision.165 
One problem with the OSC is that it does not include the target in the evidentiary 
process. Specifically, the target is not allowed to attend the hearing. The lawyer 
represents the target, even though the target is absent and therefore unable to confront or 
challenge coerced governmental evidence that may be brought against him.166 In short, 
the lawyer can attend the hearing and confront and challenge evidence, but, under the 
proposed OSC process, the target has no role in the proceedings. Stephen I. Vladeck 
believes this lack of procedural protection for the target is “controversial,” stating that 
even evidence that has been attained by governmental coercion may be used against the 
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target.167 Guiora and Brand agree that while a hypothetical OSC may be one approach to 
addressing issues concerning the role of the executive branch, the court still needs to 
overcome the hurdles of transparency, speed of decision-making, the role of the judges 
and legal representation, as well as the legal and procedural review.168  
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
One of the issues to be addressed by the OSC is the executive branch’s role in 
making determinations concerning targeted drone strikes. While Guiora and Brand 
champion the independence of the executive branch and state their awareness of the 
“difficult task of reining in executive authority,” they point out the need for oversight 
during the process.169 In short, when it comes to the role of the executive branch’s role, 
some type of oversight needs to be established to increase transparency and awareness of 
the process, such as through judicial review. However, critics such as Steven Vladeck 
disagree with this approach. Vladeck argues that the OSC structure, which allows for 
judicial review of executive branch decisions prior to any executed targeted drone strikes, 
is precarious.170 Vladeck asserts, “if one accepts that the Constitution confers any 
unilateral military power upon the Executive Branch, a proposal that would prevent uses 
of such power until and unless a federal judge signs off, is problematic on constitutional 
and practical grounds.”171 Arguably, Vladeck defends the president’s authority to act 
independently of other branches in order to protect our nation in times of national 
crises.172 Guiora and Brand refute Vladeck’s argument, countering that confidence in the 
executive branch is the “real issue”; if there are no checks to the executive branch’s 
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decision-making, the targeted killing process puts into question the basis upon which the 
decision was made.173  
C. LEGAL/PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
This section examines what is known about the type of cases the OSC court 
reviews, the lack of transparency in which it operates, the timeliness of the process, the 
role and responsibility of the OSC judges, and the procedure for legal review 
currently used. 
1. Transparency  
Such scholars as Joel H. Rosenthal have expressed that there is a lack of clarity 
(from the government) concerning what is the applicable legal interpretation for a drone 
court like the OSC: Are the drone activities to be tried under the law of armed conflict or  
under the criminal justice system?174 Glenn Sulmasy, a proponent of the OSC, states in 
part, “the military is constantly changing tactics and adapting to be able to know how best 
to combat the enemy. Although the fight against al Qaeda and international terrorism 
involve the use of the American military, unlike prior conflicts, the so-called ‘war on 
terror’ now involves the FBI, the CIA, and even local law enforcement.”175 Rosenthal 
argues that the government needs to be more transparent.176 On one hand, “the current 
administration has aligned with the criminal justice model while distancing itself from the 
war on terror language and from trying 9/11 suspects in civil court.”177 On the other 
hand, by “engaging in executive action to  drone target and kill enemies of the state, 
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President Obama has embraced the core doctrine of the war approach, which bypasses the 
legal due process of the criminal justice system.”178  
It could be argued that the OSC is a middle ground between the two competing 
frameworks to which Rosenthal makes reference. For example, while the OSC adheres to 
the processes and procedures of criminal procedure, etc., in a court of law, there is a 
provision, according to Guiora and Brand, in which the executive branch has an 
“exemption to the requirement of prior judicial approval of lethal drone strikes.”179 In 
other words, the executive branch can “bypass procedural due process and engage in 
executive action to target a U.S. citizen.”180 Rosenthal states that this criminal–war 
dichotomy arises from a nebulous connection between law enforcement and warfare.181 
Arguably, the lines are blurred between the government trying the target in a criminal 
court of law, or bypassing procedural due process and engaging in executive action to 
target a U.S. citizen.  
In light of a concern pertaining to executive drone strikes, Guiora and Brand 
assert that the OSC’s goal is to require the executive branch to produce the intelligence 
data that supports a planned drone strike. The OSC’s primary role will be to examine and 
evaluate the executive branch’s data prior to the execution of a drone strike. Such 
evaluations will help ensure transparency, and that the decision has been made in 
compliance with established judicial safeguards.182 Arguably, transparency is paramount 
in the OSC and it is crucial that established processes and procedures are in place. 
2. Timeliness  
One of the OSC’s biggest challenges is ensuring that structures are in place to 
protect the target’s right to be heard in a timely manner. In other words, the challenge is 
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to prevent the drone strike from occurring until the OSC has an opportunity to deliberate 
and make a decision. Vladeck not only has constitutional concerns in reference to prior 
judicial review of the executive branch’s decision-making authority, but that such 
requirement would also put undue pressure on OSC judges. The judges may have 
insufficient notice and time to adequately vet the decision. Vladeck states that “part of 
why such an approach is problematic and raises constitutional concerns … is that the 
prior judicial approval would place pressure on the OSC judges to sign off on cases on 
which they have doubt.”183  
Vladeck likens this dilemma to law enforcement’s use of force for self-defense. 
He points out the “impossibility of requiring a law enforcement officer to obtain judicial 
review before they use lethal force in self-defense or for a third party.”184 Vladeck argues 
that the need to obtain prior judicial review is circumspect “since the entire legal question 
turns on what was actually true in the moment, as opposed to what might have been 
predicted to be true in advance. Without such facts, are judges really going to tie the 
Executive Branch’s hands?”185 In response to Vladeck’s argument, Guiora and Brand 
state that the role of the OSC is not to “supplant the executive branch’s decision-making 
in determining whether a particular drone strike is warranted,” but to make sure that there 
is a proper balance between the roles of the judicial and executive branches.186   
3. Judges and Legal Representation  
The OSC will make a selection of “current” sitting federal judges, according to 
Guiora and Brand, from “diverse judicial backgrounds”187 The judges will be evenly 
distributed—twelve will be from the district courts and twelve from the court of appeals, 
and each will serve a four-year term.188 If a judge is selected to work in the OSC, their 
prior roles and responsibilities will be adjusted so that the OSC responsibilities can be 
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added to their prior judicial duties.189 Also, the role of the judiciary under the OSC will 
not only be to oversee court hearings about a drone target, but also to be responsible for 
reviewing intelligence submitted by the executive branch.  
Once the government has determined a target, the OSC is subsequently notified 
by the executive branch to hold a hearing.190 The attorney, who is representing the target 
in absentia (i.e., the target is being represented by the attorney, in his absence) will have 
an opportunity to review and cross-examine those who brought evidence against the 
target, such as “government intelligence analysts.”191 Additionally, the hearing will be 
closed to the public.192 If the government meets its burden, the targeting proceeds, or the 
matter can be appealed.193 However, the target is summarily assigned counsel without his 
or her knowledge. Moreover, even though the attorney appears and challenges the 
evidence presented against the target, the target is unaware that the proceeding is taking 
place, and is absent from the process.194 Arguably, the need for judicial oversight of the 
executive branch’s role in the drone process and the executive branch’s need to protect 
the nation’s security is a balancing of interests. Such decisions will need to be made on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure that the executive branch’s actions are not overbroad, and to 
ensure that the judiciary process does not hinder the president’s authority to protect the 
nation against threats.195  
The judges in the OSC, according to Guiora and Brand, have two primary 
functions: to ensure that the target is represented—although it “falls far short of the 
standard envisioned by the Confrontation Clause”—and to substantiate the evidence 
brought by the executive branch against the target.196 In sum, it could be argued that the 
OSC addresses two of the most critical needs concerning the drone targeting of U.S. 
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citizens: internal structures have been established from which the target has a right to due 
process, and the method by which a determination is made to release the drone is 
transparent. Moreover, the OSC judges are federal judges and experts at reviewing the 
intelligence information and making rational decisions based upon the available facts.197 
It could be argued that they are legally and technically equipped to do the job. 
4. Procedure for Legal Review  
In the hypothetical OSC, Guiora and Brand explain that the court will not only 
resemble an intimate part of our Article III judicial system, but it will be a reflection of 
our core values: symbolizing a court that is independent and far from the influence of 
outside forces, as well as a court that functions with transparency. Furthermore,  the OSC 
will be a forum in which the target is afforded right to counsel and an opportunity for the 
target’s counsel to examine the veracity of the facts, as well as the evidence brought 
before the court.198  
Article III courts are rooted in constitutional and legal tradition. Vladeck affirms 
this, explaining that, as part of the established American judicial system, we have “the 
right to confront witnesses under the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause; the 
exclusion of hearsay evidence and evidence obtained through coercion; the right to self-
representation; and the right to a trial by a jury of the defendant’s peers.”199 However, 
because the OSC rules are somewhat relaxed, according to Guiora and Brand, the OSC 
would not be a duplicate of an Article III court.200 For example, they state that the OSC 
rules do not allow the target the right to confront witnesses, although he will have legal 
counsel to challenge the witnesses for him.201 Furthermore, there is no right to a jury 
trial, nor is the trial open to the public.202 Additionally, they point out that coerced 
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governmental evidence may be used against the target, this arguably violates the the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause, which prevents the admission of hearsay.203  
The notion upon which the OSC will be established is to ensure that the target has 
a right to due process and to ensure that such procedural safeguards are in place, although 
there are flaws in this procedure according to Guiora and Brand.204 One of the OSC’s 
strengths is that the target’s attorney will have access to the military expertise needed to 
decipher the intelligence data used in the hearing.205 Guiora and Brand expound on this 
point by stating that “counsel for the target would have access to military experts 
designated by the court who would brief counsel as necessary concerning the meaning 
and content of the intelligence reports.”206 Guiora and Brand acknowledge that the 
OSC’s approach to incorporating the Sixth Amendment is “not perfect,” but the system is 
a “workable process given the context of the court’s processes” and is “continually in the 
process of being developed.”207  
In short, in using the OSC as a model, admittedly, the court has procedures that 
would not pass “constitutional muster in a federal district court criminal proceeding.”208 
In other words, this is how the court will function, but it will not be without challenges. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In their OSC proposal, Guiora and Brand attempt to address the concerns 
pertaining to U.S. citizens deemed terrorist suspects and targeted for lethal drone attacks, 
but are neither provided an opportunity to be heard nor given notice that they are the 
subject of a drone strike decision. The OSC procedure falls short of clarifying the 
dichotomy between armed conflict and criminal justice.  
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One challenge to the OSC’s judicial structure is that the judges rotate. The judges’ 
ongoing rotations may be problematic in that continuity of facts, information familiarity 
with the cases and its nuances, etc., may be lost if the judge has to “rotate out” before he 
or she has had an opportunity to hear the case while the law and facts are still fresh in 
mind. On the contrary, the ongoing judicial rotations could be instrumental in preventing 
rulings based on bias. In other words, as Guiro and Brand point out, the judges will not 
become ossified or stale with the case nor the facts if they are rotated on an ongoing 
basis.  
Details about the timeliness of the OSC process were vague in reference to 
“when” particular procedures occur in the process, after the executive branch has notified 
the OSC to request an immediate hearing. For example, there are no timeframes 
describing when the target’s attorney comes aboard, nor when the judges are scheduled to 
participate in hearings.209 It could be argued, however, that the more immediate a threat, 
the greater the need for a quick decision. It remains unclear what steps are required to 
ensure that the decision has been properly vetted and if it has been executed in a timely 
manner. However, the procedure for legal review was strong in detail.   
A challenge with the OSC is that constitutional procedural protections such as the 
right to a hearing, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to a public trial are not 
included in the OSC model. As discussed previously, the target has right to counsel in 
this forum, but not a right to be at the hearing, nor the right to personally confront and 
cross-examine evidence that may be brought against him. The target’s attorney being 
apprised of the intelligence data and able to confront or cross-examine on behalf of the 
target does not go far enough to address these constitutional challenges. 
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IV. THE COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS 
The DOD created the CSRT following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, and on July 7, 2004, “the U.S. government established the CSRT process at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.”210 Even though the Court found that Hamdi was 
guaranteed due process as a U.S. citizen, it was argued that, as a citizen, he should have 
been given a “meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before 
a neutral decision maker.”211 In the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor, joined by the 
Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, concluded that “although Congress 
authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, 
due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be 
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a 
neutral decision maker.”212 The CSRTs were established, by order of U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, as a viable forum for guaranteeing a procedure for legal review 
in which prospective enemy combatant cases could be heard.213   
This chapter examines what is known about how CSRTs review cases, the 
transparency issues surrounding its procedures, the timeframe in which the issues are 
heard and the timeliness of the process, the role and responsibility of the CSRT Tribunal 
(three military officers who hear the cases), and the procedure for legal review currently 
used. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The CSRT is, in essence, a military tribunal. The DOD defines CSRT as a 
one-time administrative process designed to determine whether each 
detainee under the control of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo 
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. Each detainee 
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has the opportunity to contest such designation. It is not a criminal trial 
and it is not intended to determine guilt or innocence; rather, it is an 
administrative process structured under the law of war (e.g., Geneva 
Convention Article 5) to confirm the status of enemy combatant detained 
at Guantanamo as part of the Global War on Terrorism.214  
While the Court in Hamdi recognized the “power of the U.S. government to detain enemy 
combatants, including U.S. citizens, it ruled that detainees who are U.S. citizens must 
have the rights of due process and the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status 
before an impartial authority.”215   
Thomas R. Johnson gives a detailed roadmap of how the CSRT functions.216 
According to Johnson, when a detainee wants to challenge his status as an enemy 
combatant, the CSRT will hold a hearing. Those who participate in the hearing are the 
detainee and a personal representative who will advise the detainee of the charges against 
him. However, the detainee is denied the right to counsel, has limited access to witnesses 
(witnesses attending hearing are at the discretion of the government), and has limited 
access to review evidence the government brings against him (e.g., classified 
evidence).217 Three “neutral commissioned officers” hear the case.218   
Gordon R. England elaborates on the qualifications of the tribunal and assesses 
that those chosen are senior military from across the board (e.g., majors from Navy, 
Airforce, etc.) and have been previously screened to ensure that there is no bias. For 
example, the military officials answer questionnaires that are part of the military 
personnel process.219 It is unlikely that there will be a personal connection between the 
detainee and the board. Also, because the tribunal consists of senior military officials, 
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there is a concern that the “judges” will bring a war-mindedness into their decision-
making as a tribunal.  
“The standard of evidence that the hearing officers use, according to Johnson, is a 
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., the civil court standard used to make 
determinations—whether it is more likely than not that the case has been proven).”220 
England explains that the additional criteria the tribunal uses to make enemy combatant 
determinations is the “totality of the circumstances” and the relevant available data. It is 
essential, England continues, that all data is brought forward so that the best-informed 
decisions can be made, which includes bringing forth affidavits or witnesses on behalf of 
the enemy combatant.221  
The purpose of the CSRTs is not to determine guilt or innocence, but rahter, 
according to England, “to determine if the detainee had the status of an enemy combatant 
(e.g., one who directly provokes or supports actions against the United States), and if it 
was determined by the CSRT that he did have the status of an enemy combatant—he 
could be retained by the United States.”222 It could be argued that the CSRT is like a 
grand jury for terrorism suspects, except the tribunal is not evaluating probably cause to 
determine if a crime has been committed by the detainee, which is the standard for the 
grand jury.223 What the tribunal is determining is if the target’s combat status puts him in 
the literal and figurative cross hairs of further detention, and if he is classified as an 
enemy combatant.   
In the Supreme Court’s Hamdi ruling, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed the right of 
the target to go before a neutral decision maker to challenge his status. She states in part,  
We are called upon to consider the legality of the Government’s detention 
of a United States citizen on United States soil as an “enemy combatant” 
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and to address the process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks 
to challenge his classification as such. … We hold that although Congress 
authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances 
alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States 
as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker.224 
Justice O’Connor further points out that “American citizens could be detained as an 
enemy combatant when they have associated themselves with the military arm of the 
enemy government,” as Hamdi exhibited through his association with the Taliban.225 
Furthermore, the military proceedings used were deemed sufficient to meet procedural 
due process standards for an enemy combatant.226  
As described in the legal basis of U.S. Detention Policies, the CSRT mirrors many 
of the “procedures and protections found in the AR 190-8 cited by the Supreme Court as 
sufficient for the detention of United States citizen.”227 Secretary Gordon asserts that the 
United States uses AR 190-8 to implement Article 5 of the Geneva Convention.228 Both 
procedures are jointly incorporated as part of the CSRT.229 In short, it could be argued 
that the CSRT is a combination of the existing AR 190-8 and Article 5 of the Geneva 
Convention. As an illustration, according to the Geneva Convention, “When combatant 
status is unclear, the Third Geneva Convention states that the captives must be afforded 
the protection of prisoner-of-war (POW) status until a tribunal meets and determines that 
the captive does not qualify as a lawful combatant.”230 The U.S. Detention Policy 
describes these tribunals as “typically held on the battlefield within a short time of 
capture, and an officer makes a quick determination, based on all the relevant evidence 
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available at the time, whether the captive is properly classified as a combatant or 
noncombatant.”231  
The language under AR 190-8 sounds similar to the Article 5 language. AR 190-8 
is used by the DOD “when a captive’s legal status is in doubt, and therefore a tribunal 
under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention is required. The regulation spells out the 
procedures the U.S. military must follow to determine a captive’s legal status as a 
combatant or non-combatant.”232 The language further states that “the AR 190-8 
proceeding is a simple one-time administrative hearing, usually held on the battlefield, to 
determine whether or not a captive should be held for the duration of the conflict.”233 
Both processes use Article 5 when the captive’s status is uncertain. Moreover, Article 5 
tribunals, as well as AR 190-8, hold hearings on the battlefield.234 The policy language 
specifically refers to AR 190-8 battlefield hearings as a “simple one-time administrative 
hearing.”235  
Furthermore, Article 5 and AR 190-8 are similar in processes and procedures. 
However, the language in each policy is unclear; for example, the language used to 
explain how a captive is classified in Article 5 states that “the determination [of captive’s 
status] will be made based upon evidence deemed relevant at the time.”236 AR 190-8 
follows the same proceeding and language as Article 5 for determining the status of a 
captive. However, in both cases, neither Article 5 nor AR 190-8 gives the criteria or 
standards that are used for determining the status of a captive. Moreover, even though 
both procedures are incorporated into the CSRT, the CSRT is broader in scope and offers 
“more protections and processes to detainees than required by the Geneva Convention or 
AR 190-8.”237   
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While the Supreme Court deemed the military proceedings (i.e., AR 190-8) 
sufficient to meet due process standards, there is a general concern, from scholars such as 
Gonzales about the president’s authority to designate someone as an enemy 
combatant.238 Gonzales’ argument is explored in his analysis of the CSRT process and 
the role of the executive branch. 
B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Concerning the president’s role in the CSRT process—what is the extent of a 
president’s authority to designate an American citizen an enemy combatant? It is well 
known, Gonzales explains, that having this is sufficient grounds to target an American 
citizen for a drone strike.239  
An illustration of this point is the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen born in 
New Mexico and educated in the United States.240 According to Gonzales, over a period 
of time al-Awlaki was “suspected of associating with two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-
Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian 
national who attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253.”241 Al-Awlaki was 
also suspected of encouraging Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter and “facilitating 
terrorist training camps.”242 Although “there was no evidence that al-Awlaki was aware 
that he was on the kill list nor of any reasons for being on the list, President Obama 
sanctioned that he be targeted, and he was eventually killed by a drone strike.”243 There 
are those, such as Gonzales, who question that authority. In his CSRT analysis, Gonzales 
proposes “steps that the United States government should consider to ensure fairness of 
the process such as a checks-and-balances approach, in which Congress would review 
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any drone target decisions made by the President, in addition to appointing an advocate, 
on behalf of the accused.244   
Along the same lines, Glenn Sulmasy, in describing his CSRT “hybrid” approach 
(i.e., an Operational Security Court run by civilians), envisions detainees staying in 
prisons built on military bases. In his “hybrid” court, the “President would retain some 
thin authority to detain those found not guilty under extreme circumstances, but there 
would be strict safeguards on the exercise of this power, and its exercise would be 
public.”245 Arguably, Gonzales and Sulmasy both agree the president should have a role 
in the overall military detainee process, but it is unclear the extent to which this authority 
should be exercised. 
C. LEGAL/PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
This section examines what is known about the type of cases the CSRT court 
reviews, the lack of transparency in which it operates, the timeliness of the process, the 
CSRT judges’ role and responsibility, and the current procedure for legal review. 
1. Transparency 
Tom Johnson, counsel for one of the Guantanamo detainees experienced firsthand 
the challenges that detainees and those who are appointed by the CSRT to advise them 
have experienced. Johnson encountered problems with the inadequate transparency, legal 
representation, and procedural due process, and with the timeframe and tribunal decision-
making process. These were the same challenges, he emphasized that detainees going 
through the CSRT process faced. For example, Johnson represented Ihlkham Battayev, 
who was known as detainee number 84.246 
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According to Johnson, Battayev, a citizen of Kazakhstan and a native Uzbek, was 
married and had a family.247 “After Battayev had lost his job coaching soccer, he started 
selling fresh fruit and other agricultural products on the market. During one of his travels 
to obtain fresh fruit, a Tajik man named Kari approached him and offered to sell Battayev 
fruit from his private orchard. Battayev agreed, and Kari drove Battayev to a farm well 
outside of town.”248 Based on Johnson’s account, Kari took Battayev to the Taliban and 
left him there. When he refused to join the Taliban despite the group’s coercion, they 
held him captive. Eventually, while en route to another destination, the Taliban and 
Battayev were seized and turned over to the United States.249  
While in Afghanistan, Battayev was “never provided any process to determine his 
status as an enemy combatant.”250 Additionally, although Battayev was vigorously 
questioned about his origin, he was never questioned about his status as a soldier.251 
Furthermore, Battayev “had almost no time talking with Americans before his transport 
to Guantanamo, nor did he have an opportunity to explain why he should not be taken 
away from his wife, children, and family for five years.”252 Arguably, the CSRT process 
lacked transparency when it failed to provide Battayev a full and fair process to 
determine his status as an enemy combatant.253  
Such critics as Joseph Blocher argue that the term “enemy combatant” itself lacks 
transparency.254  According to Blocher, the “U.S. government has argued that the CSRTs 
which were established to determine the enemy combatant status of Guantanamo 
detainees, and which completed their work in March, [also] properly adjudicated the 
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[prisoner of war (POW)] status of the detainees.”255 Blocher argues that there is an 
overlap in the definition between enemy combatant and POW; when the CSRT 
determines a detainee’s enemy combatant status, it is actually “supporting a detainee’s 
POW status.”256 Blocher asserts that the definition for enemy combatant “overlaps” with 
the definition for POW and concludes by stating that, “even after their enemy combatant 
status has been adjudicated by the CSRTs, Guantanamo detainees should still be treated 
as presumptive POWs.”257 Johnson similarly argues that detainees not only lack 
understanding of the CSRT process, but that there is no procedural safeguard allowing 
them too rebut the government’s presumption of enemy combatant status (i.e., the 
government assumes that the detainee’s enemy status is genuine), nor is there an offer of 
evidence for their innocence (e.g., there are few to no witnesses and few documents 
available for detainees’ defense, and detainees are not afforded the opportunity to review 
the evidence used against them).258 
2. Timeliness  
The CSRT follows two flawed procedures that could challenge timeliness. The 
first is determining the status of the target, and the second is determining how long a 
detainee should be held.259 The timeframe in which the decisions are made for either 
procedure is unclear. “Under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention the tribunals are 
typically held on the battlefield within a short time of capture, and an officer makes a 
quick determination, based on all the relevant evidence available at the time, whether the 
captive is properly classified as a combatant or non-combatant.”260 Also, the CSRT 
follows the proceedings under AR 190-8, which determines if “a captive should be held 
for the duration of the conflict.”261 It could be argued that the language under Article 5 
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and AR 190-8 both lack clarity. What would initiate a “quick determination,” and how is 
“duration of the conflict” defined? Does the clock start ticking on duration of the conflict 
when the target is captured? The existing descriptive language for timeliness is 
ambiguous.  
Moreover, under these facts, it is questionable if the deciding officer has had 
adequate time to properly vet a decision, since the determination is not only made 
immediately after capture, but must be made quickly. Furthermore, the determination is 
based on “relevant evidence available at the time.”262 It could be argued that the process 
opens the door to procedural inquiries—for example, from where did the evidence come? 
Is it based on evidence that has been previously gathered against the captive, or is it 
evidence that was made available on the battlefield? Who represents the captive? Does he 
have an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, or is that delayed until he is actually 
brought to Guantanamo and detained?263 Because the language under AR 190-8 is 
similar to language in the Article 5 Tribunals, AR 190-8 has similar procedural 
challenges. Moreover, timeliness of the CSRT’s decision-making is problematic. What 
procedural safeguards are in place (e.g., are there grounds to challenge the captivity and 
status even before the detainee arrives at Guantanamo)? In short, the language in the 
various policies lacks clarity and the procedures implemented are questionable. Although 
the processes discussed may be speedy, it is questionable if they are fair. 
3. Judges and Legal Representation 
One critic CSRT critic was Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, “a 26-year 
veteran of military intelligence who served on the tribunals.”264 Abraham explained in 
affidavits, submitted in court, that the documents brought against the detainees in the 
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CSRT were “vague” and “incomplete.”265 Moreover, this approach was compounded by 
pressure to rule against the detainees without specific evidence. The DOJ immediately 
refuted Abraham’s allegation, stating that they were unsubstantiated (i.e., lacked evidence 
or proof) and, in short, he did not have a “fundamental understanding of the process.”266 
In addition, as England pointed out, while the tribunal members do not have to be 
lawyers, they must be senior military officials.267 Johnson, on this issue, asserts that 
“judges should determine the fates of the detainees.”268 Whether they are military judges 
or federal judges, lawyers should first review the cases and weigh evidence since this is a 
part of the training.269 Johnson concludes by stating that it is “essential that the arbiter of 
fact and law—military judges, are insulated from the chain of command.”270  
Not only are there challenges with the tribunal, but the lack of legal representation 
is an additional hurdle in the CSRT process. Johnson asserts that it is important that the 
detainees be given “access to counsel to counteract the lopsided nature of the CST 
proceedings.”271 He explains that many of the detainees do not speak English, and have 
no understanding of the process. In light of this, the detainees are provided with a 
“personal representative” whose role is to assist the detainee with the review process.272 
According to Johnson, however, it “seems that the role of the PR is to visit the detainee 
before the hearing and read the list of charges.”273 Arguably, the lack of counsel during 
this critical stage exemplifies how the system lacks the judicial safeguards needed to 
ensure a fair hearing. However, Gonzales disagrees with Johnson’s assessment, and states 
in part that, “today, those that are held by our government are provided procedural due 
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process through the Supreme Court’s precedence and the Executive’s CSRT process.”274 
In other words, Gonzales believes the procedure is fair. 
While the CRST has its problems, it is a system that has been established to 
ensure that U.S. and non-U.S. citizens are afforded some type of judicial review. In 
defense of Abraham’s criticisms, the DOJ stated that the tribunal was “set up to review 
the best information provided by the intelligence agencies after broad searches,” not to 
sift through layers of documents looking for additional information.275 England refers to 
part of this process as looking at the “totality of the circumstances.”276 Abraham defends 
his stance and concludes by stating that the government has “lost sight of what the CSRT 
process is all about.”277   
4. Procedure for Legal Review 
Johnson has asserted that the CSRT process lacks “procedural protection, such as 
access to evidence.”278 He explains that the tribunals are the ones who look at the 
preponderance of evidence and determine if the government has met the criteria to have 
the detainee be labeled an enemy combatant, and if the government’s evidence is genuine 
and accurate. While the tribunals are “not bound by the rules of evidence they are asked 
to consider any evidence that would be relevant and helpful, although the participation of 
the detainee at this stage is minimal.”279 The detainee’s access to evidence is uneven; the 
government has access to evidence, but the detainee cannot review the evidence that will 
be used against him. Johnson points out that the detainee also lacks legal representation 
and is “subject to whatever mail rules the military chooses for that detainee, and he has 
limited (if any) access to information outside the base.”280 Johnson points out that there 
are additional challenges with the CSRT process, such as the detainee having “limited” 
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access to witnesses; detainees can only access those witnesses that the government deems 
“reasonably available (e.g., members of the Armed Forces are not reasonably available to 
the extent that their superiors believe that their presence would affect military 
operations.”281 Additionally, because the government controls the scheduling, they have 
time to prepare for the hearing while the detainee, who has “minimal notice” of the 
hearing, has less time to prepare to refute the allegations.282  
Although such critics as Gonzales, Johnson, Blocher, and Sulmasy have 
challenged the CSRT’s processes or procedures, at times, it could be argued that the 
process does work. An illustration of this can be seen in the eventual resolution of 
Battayev’s case. However, one of the pivotal factors upon which Battayev’s case turned 
was his access to witnesses, who were able to confirm his story.283 Still, the CSRT must 
be reformed to ensure that detainees have proper access to counsel and witnesses. In 
addition, the detainee’s access to review the evidence that will be used against him 
should be transparent, but without compromising intelligence data. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the CSRT was to establish a forum through which the DOD could 
determine detainees’ enemy combatant status.284 As part of this process, the detainee has 
a right to challenge the DOD determination. However, while there is a military process in 
place, there are procedural challenges—detainees cannot challenge their status before 
they are sent to Guantanamo and, once detained at Guantanamo, they lack access to legal 
counsel, have limited access to witnesses, lack the opportunity to review evidence that 
will be used against them, and lack general knowledge and understanding about the 
overall CSRT process.   
Johnson’s suggestion that the tribunal should consist of military lawyers (judge 
advocate generals) and federal judges is viable; the majority of the issues with the CSRT 
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are problematic legally. Legal issues include a detainee having no access to counsel, 
inadequate understanding of the timeframe in which decisions should be made, limited 
access to witnesses, and limited access to review evidence.285 Military lawyers or judges 
should be involved in the early stages of the CSRT process, according to Johnson, 
because they are in essence trained to address such issues. Johnson concludes that if the 
lawyers were involved, the overall CSRT approach would be less procedurally 
problematic—from the beginning to the end. 
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V. THE POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSES 
The government’s current drone targeting of U.S. citizens lacks procedural 
safeguards. The challenge is that no current forum exists in which a targeted U.S. citizen 
has an opportunity to be heard. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution was established 
as a judicial safeguard to protect against interference with such liberties.286 The POA 
used in this thesis examines the executive branch’s transparency, timeliness, judges and 
legal representation, and legal/procedural review. In this chapter, each forum is discussed 
and compared to the status quo to determine which forum best addresses the deficiencies 
of the current process. 
A. FISC  
1. Executive Branch  
FISC has been in existence for several decades and, through a few court 
challenges, it has remained intact as an institution. However, it has drawbacks as a model 
for the drone court. “Critics argue that because the executive branch has influence over 
FISC’s decision-making, the executive branch has very few government requests for 
warrants denied by FISC.”287  
FISC’s greatest strength has been its ability to adapt to various policies. In its 40 
years, FISC has been overseen by various administrations and has had the fortitude and 
adaptability to change without actually being overhauled. The court has been criticized as 
an extension of the executive branch as illustrated by the Bush administration’s Terror 
Surveillance Program, discussed in Chapter II, increased the scope of American data that 
the government could access. Moreover, FISC has enabled the executive branch to 
implement broader authority to conduct surveillance, such as through the 2001 Patriot 
Act.288 In short, it could be argued that a drone court needs the kind of durability that 
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FISC has had over the years—to undergo various policy and procedural changes but 
continue to operate in its capacity. 
FISC’s greatest weakness is that it lacks independence in its decision-making. 
FISC has been deemed an extension of the executive because the agency has accepted 99 
percent of government requests, showing a propensity to say “yes” to the government.289 
It could be argued that what the executive branch wants from FISC, the executive branch 
will get. During the Bush administration, for instance, FISC acquired personal data and 
other private information on Americans without a warrant or prior judicial notice, as 
discussed in Chapter II (regarding American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. National 
Security Agency et al).290  
2. Transparency 
FISC’s Rules of Procedure are known for their transparency. These rules are free 
from legal ambiguity and govern the proceedings under 50 U.S.C. The wording is not 
only straightforward, as illustrated by the language used under 50 U.S.C. 1805,291 but the 
public also has access to the rules on the FISC website.292 While the rules governing 
FISC’s proceedings are transparent under Title 50, however, it otherwise operates in 
secrecy. Because the drone courts are dealing with such issues as procedural due 
process—in which legal transparecny pertaining to constitutional rights is critical—
FISC’s lack of operational transparency is a procedurally problemtic flaw in a drone 
court. On the other hand, FISC judges such as Judge John D. Bates have argued that such 
transparency would “not likely enhance the public’s understanding of FISA’s 
                                                 
289 Jennifer Granick and Christopher Sprigman, “The Secret FISA Court Must Go,” July 24, 2013, 
Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/the-secret-fisa-court-must-go.html. 
290 Ibid. 
291 50 U.S.C. 1805(e) reads: “The Attorney General may authorize specific emergency employment of 
electronic surveillance if the Attorney General ‘reasonably believes’ that an emergency exists, ‘reasonably 
determines’ that a factual basis exists for the emergency order, he subsequently can inform the judge of the 
decision made, and the Attorney General makes an application … as soon as practicable, but not later than 
seven days after the authorization for the surveillance by the Attorney General.” 
292 “Rules of Procedure,” United States Foreign Intelligence Survey Court. 
 63 
implementation ... and release of the freestanding summaries of the court’s opinions 
would likely cause confusion and misunderstanding to the public.”293 
3. Timeliness 
It could be argued that the current FISC timeframes, processes, and procedures 
are reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances. The justification for this argument 
is that the FISC emergency order uses the seven-day window for making immediate 
decisions if, according to the statute, the attorney general “reasonably determines that an 
emergency situation exists,” or if the judge determines there is probable cause for an 
order, although in a drone court it would be probable cause for a hearing.294 Arguably, 
the immediate threat of deprivation of life under the circumstances equates with a 
reasonable determination that probable cause exists for a hearing to take place within the 
seven-day window.  
It could be argued that these standards must be met in order for a U.S. citizen to 
have the opportunity to be heard before a FISC drone court. Even if the FISC judge does 
not make a decision right awaythe timeframe in which the decision is made could still be 
reasonable. The reason for this justification is based on the FISC emergency order, which 
uses the seven-day window timeframe for making immediate decisions.     
While FISC may have established procedures to ensure timely decisions, 
decision-making speed for drone cases may be challanged by the rotation of judges. 
Arguably, the lack of continuity could interfere with the judges’ ability to review the 
intricacies of each prospective case in a timely manner. In response to Senator Patrick J. 
Leahy’s inquiry into FISC operations, Judge Bates stated that the judges have the support 
of other attorneys and legal staff to assist in evaluating applications. However, Bates 
points out that “at the discretion of the presiding judge, some of the court’s more complex 
or time-consuming matters are handled by judges outside of the duty-week system.”295  
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In short, critical factors to be considered when addressing timely judicial review 
of drone strikes are that judges have the opportunity to review and evaluate applications 
or cases, and the necessary time to perform these tasks.  
4. Judges and Legal Representation 
FISC’s judges are limited by the type of cases they can hear, and broadening their 
scope could only be accomplished through an act of Congress. According to Judge 
Reggie B. Walton, the role of the FISC judges is to determine if submitted surveillance 
applications have met the statutory legal requirements for approval.296 In addition, FISC 
judges have broad discretion to accept or deny the applications brought before them.297 
However, FISC’s authority to hear cases beyond its original purview (e.g., surveillance, 
wiretaps) would have to be implemented through an act of Congress.  
Judge Bates, in his letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein, points out several concerns 
within FISC, all of which, if allowed to remain, would prove logistically problematic for 
additional drone court operations.298 According to Judge Arnold, hearing drone cases 
would increase FISC’s workload, straining the FISC’s “small number of judges, 
attorneys, and staff [who are already] fully occupied by its current workload.”299  
In short, the workload increase and the expansion in subject-matter jurisdiction 
may be disruptive changes to the status quo. Nevertheless, these changes will be required 
if the FISC is considered for becoming the drone court forum. 
5. Procedure for Legal Review 
FISC has an established forum and procedure in place, though it is ex-parte (i.e., 
only the state has representation). In light of the status quo, which offers no format 
through which the target can have a hearing, the FISC structure is an improvement. Even 
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though FISC has an ex-parte proceeding, the target would still need to have access to an 
attorney (i.e., an adversarial proceeding), sufficient notice, and an opportunity to be 
heard.  It is critical that the adversarial proceeding is part of the FISC structure to ensure 
that the target has right to an attorney. However, expanding FISC’s procedural authority 
from ex-parte to adversarial must be promulgated through an act of Congress. Because 
the FISC has ex-parte in place, it could be argued that, with Congressional reform, the 
court could broaden its procedures and incorporate the adversarial proceeding to ensure 
that the target is represented by an attorney and that a fair hearing is held.     
However, the FISC model is inappropriate for a drone court because its ex-parte 
court proceedings are biased toward the government.300 The lack of an adversarial 
proceeding calls into question if a fair hearing could be held. Although the court will 
need to be congressionally reformed to ensure that an advocate is appointed for the 
accused, there are those who are critical of this approach. Judge Bates reaffirms that the 
ex-parte proceeding should not change and states that the participation of an advocate 
would prove unfruitful.301 He also argues that having an advocate would not promote an 
adversarial process “nor constructively assist the Courts in assessing the facts, as the 
advocate would be unable to communicate with the target or conduct an independent 
investigation.”302 In sum, Judge Bates sees no role for the advocate or a need for an 
adversarial proceeding, which falls short of the drone court requirement that the target 
have an advocate. 
6. Summary 
FISC has historically been able to operate long term under various presidents even 
though the court has been embroiled in controversy and remains an enigma to the general 
public. Because the judges rotate on a regular basis, there are concerns about timeliness, 
and the judges’ ability to analyze and vet the cases before decisions are made. 
Additionally, before the court approves an order, it relies on the evidence of the FBI, CIA 
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and NSA for justification. The challenge with this procedure is that only the government 
comes before the government to decide what the government should do. Senator Wyden 
referred to FISC as the most “one-sided court” of which he is aware.303 All of these 
characteristics would pose a problem in a FISC drone court. Moreover, while FISC has 
an established hearing process and procedural rules and guidelines in place, it lacks an 
adversarial structure and operations are somewhat nebulous. Because of these 
shortcomings, FISC would not be a suitable forum for the drone court.  
B. OSC 
1. Executive Branch  
The OSC is a proposed drone court recommended by Amos N. Guiora and Jeffrey 
S. Brand to “review executive branch drone decisions prior to their execution.”304 The 
purpose of the court would be to hear drone target cases, and to assess the information of 
the executive branch before the execution of a targeted strike. The OSC would have the 
authority to review and assess the executive branch’s intelligence prior to the execution 
of the drone strikes. Because the OSC has processes and procedures in place that would 
comport with judicial standards, it is a viable model for the drone court. One of the OCS’ 
strengths is that it provides judicial oversight of the executive branch’s role in the 
deciding drone strikes. While Guiora and Brand champion the independence of the 
executive branch and state their awareness of the “difficult task of reining in executive 
authority,” they argue that, when it comes to the role of the executive branch in making 
decisions pertaining to targeting U.S. citizens, oversight is needed to increase 
transparency.305  
On the other hand, Steven Vladeck refutes Guiora and Brand’s assessment of 
judicial oversight as an interference with the executive branch’s authority to make 
unilateral decisions in national security matters. Vladeck argues that the OSC structure, 
which allows for judicial review of executive branch decisions prior to any targeted drone 
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strikes, is precarious.306 Vladeck asserts, “if one accepts that the Constitution confers any 
unilateral military power upon the Executive Branch, a proposal that would prevent uses 
of such power until and unless a federal judge signs off, is problematic on constitutional 
and practical grounds.”307 Vladeck’s argument concerning the president’s authority to act 
independently of other branches in order to protect our nation in times of national crises 
is a sound, but it does not mitigate the fact that some type of judicial oversight would still 
be needed. 
2. Transparency 
The strength of Guiora and Brand’s OSC is that it was designed with the drone 
court in mind. Additionally, they were able to address procedural due process concerns 
that a target might encounter, such as not having right to counsel, adequate notice, or an 
opportunity to be heard. The court includes an advocate for the target, but the target is not 
personally involved in the process and has no contact with advocate appointed to act on 
his behalf. The strength of the Guiora and Brand’s OSC is that it tackles these issues.  
The flaw in this forum is that there are constitutional constraints and lack of 
transparency. No public trial is available; the target has counsel, but is not allowed to 
attend the trial. Additionally, the target has no contact with the advocate appointed to act 
on his behalf. These procedures go against a foundation of the drone court, which is to 
ensure protection of constitutional rights and the integrity of procedural and judicial 
safeguards. While Guiora and Brand have addressed the target’s need for an attorney, the 
issue is that the target is represented in absentia and, thus, lacks the opportunity to have 
input into the review and cross-examine those who would bring evidence against 
him.”308 Additionally, the hearing is closed to the public, although the attorney can 
appeal the decision to the appellate court.309  
                                                 






The OSC does not adequately cover the timeliness of the process as it relates to a 
drone court. Within Guiora and Brand’s OSC drone court proposal, there is some 
discussion about the time constraints in reference to judicial review, but it could be 
argued that their OSC does not articulate the bigger picture of the process’ timeliness As 
a result, Michael Eshaghian’s “timeliness of the process” was used as the point of 
reference for determining the timeframe in which a decision should be made before 
targeting a U.S. citizen for a drone attack. Eshaghian argues that there is time to 
deliberate the facts of a case and to review the intelligence before striking a target. He 
states that the decision to strike should be deliberate and not hurriedly made.310 
According to Eshaghian, and as noted in Chapter III, the decision to target can be made 
years in advance.311   
Guiora and Brand’s OSC timeframe emphasizes the role of the executive branch 
and whether or not there is an “imminent threat” to national security, as deemed by the 
executive branch. Arguably, they discuss that the more immediate the threat, the greater 
the need for a quick decision. That does not take into consideration, however, the varied 
details or steps that are needed to ensure the case details have been properly vetted. 
4. Judges and Legal Representation 
The judges and legal representation structure is a strength of the OSC because of 
the proposed judges’ diversity and expertise. The judicial structure under the OSC would 
be strong and replete with established judges whose “sole responsibility will be to 
evaluate drone strikes.”312 Guiora and Brand further assert that the OSC will be based on 
the Article III federal court structures.313 The primary contrast between the two courts is 
that the OSC will utilize sitting judges (e.g., current judges), unlike the Article III courts, 
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which use a “cadre of newly appointed Senate-confirmed judges.”314 The judges selected 
for the OSC drone court will come from the federal district courts or from the court of 
appeals. Additionally, each judge will have a background and working knowledge of 
federal law and procedure concerning constitutional challenges. Because the judges will 
have expertise in hearing federal cases, they will arguably be well versed in hearing cases 
pertaining to Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues for the prospective drone cases.  
In response to this constitutional challenge, Guiora and Brand concede that “the 
Drone Court would be a very different forum in which he or she is to be tried.”315 The 
fact that the accused may be affected by a negative outcome from the hearing—he has 
been given right to counsel, but has not been given personal notice—goes against the 
established protective measures enshrined in the Constitution. 
5. Procedure for Legal Review 
One of the OSC’s strengths is that the executive branch’s decision-making 
process is reviewed, and the target is represented through counsel in the proceeding, as 
discussed in Chapter III. However, a problem with the OSC is that the “cross 
examination” proceeding for the target’s attorney is ambiguous. Guiora and Brand point 
out that the “cross examination [for the target’s attorney] will be conditioned on the 
executive branch sharing … the intelligence information in its entirety and in a timely 
manner to allow for adequate preparation by the target’s counsel.”316   
6. Summary 
The judges in the OSC, according to Guiora and Brand, have two primary 
functions. The first is to ensure that the target is represented, although it “falls far short of 
the standard envisioned by the Confrontation Clause.”317 The second is to substantiate 
the executive branch’s evidence against the target.318 The OSC arguably addresses two of 
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the most critical needs concerning the drone targeting of U.S. citizens. The first need 
OSC addresses is to establish internal structures that protect the integrity of the target’s 
right to due process, and the second is that it has ensured that the method is transparent. 
Additionally, the OSC’s strength lies in its sound judicial structure and the procedural 
format under which it would operate. However, the structure lacks a specific timeframe 
in which decisions could or should be made. Even though the timeframe is uncertain, 
there is an assumption that the OSC would follow the procedures of Article III courts as 
discussed in Chapter III. The OSC has its procedural challenges, but because it is a 
structure similar to the Article III courts, but not the same as the Article III courts, it 
could be argued that the OSC has a strong foundation as a suitable drone forum.  
C. CSRT 
1. Executive Branch 
The CSRT was established as a result of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.319 “The CSRT is a 
one-time administrative process designed to determine whether each detainee under the 
control of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo meets the criteria to be designated 
as an enemy combatant.”320 Some of the processes are procedurally vague. These factors 
pose problems, particularly as a model for the drone court. 
Gonzales asserts not only that there is a need for Congress and the president to 
propose additional measures before American citizens are placed on the kill list for drone 
strikes, but also that such procedures must comply with constitutional guarantees.321 
However, it is unclear if the executive branch’s decision to target U.S. enemy combatants 
is in response to the president’s overreach or in response to Congress’ limits upon his 
office. These arguments all trace back to fundamental questions about the bounds of 
executive authority as established in Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer.322   
                                                 
319 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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 71 
Under the CSRT drone court, Gonzales points out that the president would have 
to notify Congress of any potential U.S. citizen target. “An issue concerning the role of 
the President, under the CSRT pertains to the extent of the authority that a President has 
to designate an American citizen as an enemy combatant.”323 The congressional 
notification is not part of the current forum. However, the implementation of this process 
would “propose additional measures that Congress and the President can take to ensure 
that the procedures comply with constitutional guarantees of due process.”324 
2. Transparency 
One of the challenges with the CSRT process is the unclear definition of an 
enemy combatant.325 Critic Joseph Blocher states that the “U.S. government has argued 
that the CSRTs, which were established to determine the enemy combatant status of 
Guantanamo detainees, and which completed their work in March, [also] properly 
adjudicated the POW status of the detainees.”326 In essence, Blocher argues that there is 
an overlap in the definitions of enemy combatant and POW and, as a result, when the 
CSRT makes a determination about the detainees’ enemy combatant status, the CSRT is 
“actually supporting a detainee’s POW status.”327  
3. Timeliness 
The CSRT has two processes related to timeliness that lack clarity. The processes 
for classifying a target and determining the extent to which a captive should be held are 
both ambiguous. As discussed in Chapter IV, the language under Article 5 states in part 
that the determinations for classifications are made on the battlefield shortly after capture. 
In other words, the determinations are made quickly based on evidence available at that 
time. Because the determinations are made “quickly,” and the government is proceeding 
unilaterally, it is unclear if the captive has been given prior notice about the government’s 
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actions. Similarly, the process in which a determination is made about the duration of the 
captive’s imprisonment is also ambiguous. Both processes raise more questions than 
answers. In either scenario, it is unclear if the deciding officers have had adequate time to 
properly vet the decisions. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter IV, it could be argued 
that the process opens the door to procedural inquiries concerning not only the origin of 
the evidence but also the credibility of the evidence that would be used against the target. 
4. Judges and Legal Representation 
In the CSRT process, senior military officials—rather than attorneys—participate 
in the tribunal and the detainees do not have access to counsel. According to Johnson, 
“Judges should determine the fates of the detainees … whether they are military judges or 
federal judges.”328 Johnson further argues that, “concerning the tribunals, it should be 
lawyers in the first instance to review the cases and weigh evidence since this is a part of 
the training.”329 Additionally, Johnson asserts that it is important that the detainees be 
given “access to counsel to counteract the lopsided nature of the CST proceedings.”330 
Johnson points out that the detainees often do not speak English, do not understand the 
process, do not have the right to counsel, cannot see all the evidence that the government 
intends to use against them, and can call limited witnesses to testify on their behalf.331 
The “only presence they are provided is that of a Personal Representative who is to visit 
the detainee before the hearing and read the list of charges.”332  
Arguably, the lack of counsel throughout the process exemplifies the inadequate 
judicial safeguards that ensure a fair hearing. One of the purposes of the drone court is to 
ensure procedural fairness in a court of law. The lack of right to counsel would be 
procedurally problematic in a drone court; as a result, this forum should not be 
considered a viable drone court forum.  
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5. Procedure for Legal Review 
The tribunals examine the preponderance of the evidence and decide if the 
detainee has met the criteria to be labeled an enemy combatant, and also determine if the 
government’s evidence is genuine and accurate. The problem with this structure is that 
the target does not have access to all the evidence that can be used against him in his 
combatant status hearing. Furthermore, the government can decide to consider any 
evidence that it deems relevant or helpful, while the detainee has limited access to 
evidence.333 It could be argued that the detainee’s right to a fair trial, access to witnesses, 
and right to cross examine are impeded and can be deemed a major hindrance to any 
evidence that would be relevant and helpful in a drone court forum.        
6. Summary 
The purpose of the CSRT was to establish a forum in which the DOD could 
determine the enemy combatant status of detainees.334 The CSRT method is questionable 
at times due to the process’ lack of clarity. While the CSRT has established procedures in 
place, it can be argued that the detainee is denied the right to counsel at a critical stage of 
the process. The personal representative’s role is only to inform the detainee of the 
charges brought before him, and nothing more. Also, the proceedings that take place 
before the detainee arrives at Guantanamo are somewhat cryptic. The absence of 
attorneys at the beginning of the proceeding—and throughout the process for the 
detainee—hinders the detainee’s insurance of a fair hearing. 
D. CONCLUSION 
1. Executive Branch 
Under the OSC, the role of the executive branch will be subject to judicial 
review.335 
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Concerning the role of the executive branch, the OSC is the strongest of the 
forums to be considered for a drone court. Guiora and Branch have incorporated judicial 
oversight structure of the executive branch’s role in the decision-making process of drone 
strikes. Furthermore, they have pointed out the need for judicial oversight during the 
executive branch’s role prior to the actual drone strike.336  
In contrast, FISC has been criticized for being an extension of the executive 
branch, as well as for lacking independence. In addition, FISC has approved 99 percent 
of government requests, which arguably raises an inference of inherent bias that FISC has 
for the executive branch. Although the CSRT lacks transparency regarding the executive 
branch’s authority to designate an American citizen as an enemy combatant, this is an 
issue that Gonzales would address in his proposal. However, because the role of the 
executive branch under FISC and CSRT is inconclusive, it would make an effective for 
drone court. 
2. Transparency 
In the area of transparency, the OSC is the best-suited drone court forum. The 
strength of Guiora and Brand’s OSC is that the court is structured with drones in mind. 
Moreover, the OSC addresses constitutional concerns that a drone target could encounter 
as part of the legal process, such as implementation of procedural due process, and right 
to counsel.   
In contrast, the FISC functions in a shroud of secrecy and lacks operational 
transparency. The CSRT also has its problems. One of the primary purposes of the CSRT 
is to define what an enemy combatant is, and it fails to do this. In other words, the term 
enemy combatant lacks transparency according to Joseph Blocher. In short, Blocher 
argues that the definition for enemy combatant “overlaps” with the definition for POW 
and assesses that “even after their enemy combatant status has been adjudicated by the 
CSRTs, Guantanamo detainees should still be treated as presumptive POWs.”337 
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Arguably, both, FISC and the CSRT lack transparency and therefore should not be 
considered for a drone court. 
3. Timeliness 
FISC’s current timeframes, processes, and procedures are arguably reasonable 
and sufficient enough to grant a U.S. citizen an opportunity for judicial review in a drone 
court. The justification for this argument is that the FISC emergency order uses the 
seven-day window for making immediate decisions if, according to the statute, the 
attorney general “reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists,” or if the 
judge determines there is probable cause for an order (although, in a drone court, it would 
be probable cause for a hearing).338 It could be argued that an imminent drone strike of a 
U.S. citizen would qualify as an emergency and avail the target an opportunity to be 
heard. In contrast, the OSC has vague timeframes for when the target’s attorney should 
come aboard, and the CSRT lacks clarity on the timeframe in which detainees can 
challaenge their enemy combatant status.  
4. Judges and Legal Representation 
The diversity of the judges and the presence of an advocate for the target are the 
OSC’s strengths. The judicial structure proposed by Guiora and Brand has the sole 
responsibility of evaluating drone strikes and ensuring that procedural due process 
protections are established.339 Moreover, the OSC will be similar to etsablished Article 
III court structures.340 The scope of FISC judges would have to be broadened in order to 
hear drone cases. However, it has been argued by some judges, such as Bates, that the 
court already has enough work, and an increase in the type of cases they hear would be 
disruptive.  
The CSRT lacks the legal presence reflected in FISC. The lack of legally trained 
representation at the initial stages of the CSRT proceedings, and the lack of attorneys as 
part of the tribunal, is problematic, according to Johnson. Johnson argues that judges 
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should determine the fate of detainees, and attorneys should represent detainees since 
both are legally trained to review cases and weigh evidence.341 Arguably, FISC and the 
CSRT do not meet prospective drone court requirement for available judges to conduct 
hearings and attorneys for legal representation.  
5. Procedure for Legal Review 
The OSC’s strength is that the overall processes, roles, and responsibilities of the 
executive branch, the military, and intelligence experts, as well as the advocate for the 
target, are established. Each role is concise, as illustrated in Chapter III. In contrast, FISC 
has an established ex-parte proceeding which Senator Ron Wyden has called one-
sided.342 Although the government has the ex-parte proceeding, FISC lacks an 
adversarial proceeding that would represent the target.   
Furthermore, under the CSRT a detainee is not availed of the right to review all 
the evidence that could be used against him and the target has little to no access to 
witnesses. In short, it could be argued that FISC and the CSRT lack sufficient procedural 
safeguards that would ensure a fair hearing, and which would be a requirement in a drone 
court. 
Policy option B, the Operational Security Court was chosen as the best option to 
be considered for a drone forum and to ensure that these rights are protected, as shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Policy Options Evaluation 
 
Policy Option A 
FISC 
Policy Option B 
OSC 
Policy Option C 
CSRT 
Criteria    
Executive Branch No Yes No 
Transparency No Yes No 
Timeliness Yes No No 
Judges and Legal 
Representation No Yes No 
Procedure for 
Legal Review No Yes No 
Score Total Yes = 1 No = 4 
Yes = 4 
No = 1 
Yes = 0 
No = 5 
 
6. Summary 
While the OSC is the closet forum for being considered a drone court, it will need 
to be modified through policies that address issues of timeliness and OSC operational 
procedures. The suggested modifications would ensure that procedural due process for 
U.S. citizens is implemented and the integrity of the Constitution preserved. 
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